



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961-1963**

Volumes X/XI/XII

**American Republics;
Cuba 1961-1962;
Cuban Missile Crisis
and Aftermath**

**Microfiche
Supplement**

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30

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years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this microfiche supplement, which was compiled in 1990-1992, meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This supplement is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series for the years 1961-1963. The subseries presents in 25 print volumes and 5 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Kennedy's administration. The record of U.S. policy toward Cuba and its international ramifications, including the events and policy discussions attending the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, is presented in *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962 and volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, volume XII presents the record of U.S. foreign policy toward Argentina, Brazil, British Guiana, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, and Peru as well as documentation on U.S. involvement in the establishment of the Alliance for Progress and U.S. policies regarding Latin American security issues.

The microfiche publication presents additional documents that supplement the printed record on policies with respect to Cuba. The publication also includes documents on U.S. policies toward Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela that deserve to be published in the *Foreign Relations* series but because of space limitations cannot be included in the printed volume. Of particular importance are 1960 documents on the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation that were not included in the 1958-1960 Cuba volume, notes based on meetings of President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the missile crisis, additional intelligence on the missile crisis and aftermath, and the formal appraisal of the Bay of Pigs operation by the CIA Inspector General including the internal commentary that it generated within the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign pol-

icy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. In preparing the documentation in this microfiche regarding policies toward Cuba, the editors benefited from unprecedented access to the records of the CIA as well as from the assistance of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. The preparation of the other portions of this microfiche documenting aspects of U.S. policy toward 11 Western Hemisphere nations was carried out prior to the expansion of access for State Department historians in CIA records developed in cooperation with the CIA History Staff. That portion of the microfiche therefore does not reflect the range of intelligence activities and information comparable to that presented with respect to Cuba.

The editors had complete access to all the retired records and papers in the Department of State including certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the Cuba supplement.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also had access to the papers of President Kennedy and other White House foreign policy records at the John F. Kennedy Library. The records maintained and preserved there include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies. Department of State historians also had full access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and his major assistants.

The Central Intelligence Agency currently provides access for Department historians to high-level and working-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of that Agency. Department historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. The development of this access arrangement coincided with the research of many of the volumes for the 1961-1963 triennium. The documents included here for volumes X and XI reflect this expanded access to intelligence records, which was undertaken with the invaluable cooperation of the Central Intelligence Agency History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. The research of documents for the micro-

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fiche supplement for volume XII was completed before such expanded access was achieved. The editors decided to proceed to publication with what documentation had already been acquired rather than delay the supplement's publication further beyond the 30-year line.

The List of Sources (pages 1-11) lists the files consulted both in government repositories and in private collections for the print volumes and the microfiche supplement.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the *Foreign Relations* series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in a microfiche supplement or in bibliographical notes.

Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for the Microfiche Supplement to Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volumes X, XI, and XII

The research for print volumes X and XI was completed in 1996. The research for volume XII and the American Republics compilations in the microfiche supplement was completed in 1992. The principles of selection followed by the editors for the print volumes are described in the prefaces of those volumes. The volumes may be used without this supplement, but the supplement should be used in conjunction with the printed volumes.

The documents selected for this microfiche publication by the editors of volumes X and XI provide additional details on the major issues covered, as well as selected documents of less than major significance not chosen for inclusion in the print volumes. This supplement also includes several lengthy attachments to printed documents for which there was no space in the respective volumes. The microfiche supplement to volume XII is different in that it includes the primary selections for U.S. policy toward countries that were not included in the print volume. The Office of the Historian determined that the documentary record of certain episodes in U.S. relations with and policies taken during the Kennedy Presidency toward Bolivia, Chile, Co-

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lombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela were important for a complete and accurate record of policies with regard to the Western Hemisphere and would be adequately available to users of the *Foreign Relations* series published in a microfiche supplement. The determination by no means implies that these 11 nations were any less important to the United States and its interests abroad. It means only that in the Kennedy Presidency foreign policy problems and episodes elsewhere in the hemisphere were more urgent and took more of the President's time and attention and that of his advisers. For this reason the editors decided to focus on publishing the documentary record of these events and policies in the print volume. The documents assembled in this fiche publication regarding policies for the 11 countries were compiled as if they were to be published in printed form. They have, however, not been edited or annotated in any way.

The List of Documents, which includes for each document a title, date, participants (for memoranda of conversation), from/to information, classification, number of pages, and source citation, as well as a one-sentence summary, is part of this printed guide and appears on the first two microfiche cards. The printed guide also includes Lists of Sources, Abbreviations, and Persons.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention. The Advisory Committee did not review this microfiche supplement.

Declassification Review

The final declassification review of this microfiche supplement resulted in the decision to withhold 1 percent from volume X (no documents denied), 2 percent from volume XI (2 documents denied), and 1 percent from volume XII (4 docu-

ments denied). The remaining documents, together with the documents published in the printed volumes, provide an accurate account of the foreign policy issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by the U.S. Government concerning Cuba and the American Republics during this period.

The former Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, which was superseded by Executive Order 12958 on April 20, 1995, and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the federal agencies, particularly the National Archives and Records Administration, for their cooperation in granting access to their records. They also thank officials at the John F. Kennedy Library, in particular Suzanne Forbes, and the officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, the History Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency, especially Mary McAuliffe, Vivienne Manber at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and other officials of specialized repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Louis J. Smith did the research for the supplement to volumes X and XI, and he and Charles S. Sampson selected the documents through the Cuban missile crisis. Edward C. Keefer selected the documents beginning with November 1962 through to the end of 1963. W. Taylor Fain III did the research for volume XII, and he, Edward C. Keefer, and David W. Mabon made the selections for the individual compilations. Taylor Fain selected documents for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela; Edward Keefer selected documents for El Salvador and Honduras; and David Mabon selected documents for Guatemala. All editors worked under the general supervision of then Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Vicki E. Futscher prepared the List of Documents.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

July 1998

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List of Sources

Department of State

Decimal Central Files. Through January 1963 the Department of State continued to use the decimal central files system. All the following Central File records are part of Record Group 59 and are located in National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland.

152: special missions to Central and South America
601.6111: diplomatic representation between the United States and Soviet Union
611.12: U.S. relations with Mexico
611.1231: U.S. boundaries with Mexico
611.12322: U.S.-Mexico, diversion of international waters
611.12323: U.S.-Mexico, international waterways
611.14: U.S. relations with Guatemala
611.16: U.S. relations with El Salvador
611.18: U.S. relations with Costa Rica
611.21: U.S. relations with Colombia
611.24: U.S. relations with Bolivia
611.25: U.S. relations with Chile
611.31: U.S. relations with Venezuela
611.37: U.S. relations with Cuba
611.3722: U.S. blockade of Cuba
611.61: U.S.-Soviet Union political relations
712.00: political affairs and conditions in Mexico
712.5621: sale of naval vessels to Mexico
714.00: political affairs and conditions in Guatemala
714.5622: sale of aircraft to Guatemala
715.00: political affairs and conditions in Honduras
715.04: Honduras' flag
715.11: chief executive of Honduras
715.5: Honduras' defense affairs
716.0: political affairs and conditions in El Salvador
716.02: recognition of the Government of El Salvador
718.00: political affairs and conditions in Costa Rica
721.11: chief executive of Columbia
721.5-MSP: U.S. military assistance to Columbia
722.00: political affairs and conditions in Ecuador
722.5-MSP: U.S. military assistance to Ecuador

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722.58: visits of Ecuador military
724.00: political affairs and conditions in Bolivia
725.00: political affairs and conditions in Chile
725.5-MSP: U.S. military assistance to Chile
731.00: political affairs and conditions in Venezuela
737.00: political affairs and conditions in Cuba
737.5211: U.S. intelligence activities in Cuba
737.56311: U.S. bases in Cuba
737.56361: Soviet bases in Cuba
760.551: Eastern European military personnel
761.00: political conditions in the Soviet Union
782.56311: U.S. bases in Turkey
811.10: U.S. economic relations with the Western Hemisphere
815.16: land ownership in Honduras
816.10: El Salvador financial matters
818.00: economic conditions in Costa Rica
818.10: financial matters in Costa Rica
818.13: Costa Rica's monetary system
818.18: Costa Rican immigration and emigration
818.235: Costa Rican sugar
822.10: economic conditions in Ecuador

Central Files: In February 1963 the Department of State changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The following Central Files are located in Record Group 59 at National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

AID (US) BOLIVIA: U.S. economic assistance to Bolivia
POL COL: general political affairs in Colombia
POL COSTA RICA-CUBA: general Costa Rican-Cuban relations
POL CUBA: general policy towards Cuba
POL CUBA-USSR: Soviet Union-Cuba relations
POL EL SAL: general political affairs in El Salvador
POL GUAT: general political affairs in Guatemala
POL GUAT-US: general U.S.-Guatemalan relations
POL 2 GUAT: general reports on Guatemala
POL 12 CHILE: political parties in Chile
POL 14 CHILE: elections in Chile
POL 15 GUAT: Government of Guatemala
POL 15 HOND: Government of Honduras
POL 15-1 COSTA RICA: head of state of Costa Rica

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POL 15-1 US/KENNEDY: documentation relating to President Kennedy
POL 17 COL: U.S. diplomatic and consular representation with Colombia
POL 23 COL: internal security in Colombia
POL 26 HOND: coups in Honduras
POL 27 CUBA-US: military operations between the United States and the Soviet Union
POL 30-2 CUBA: Cuban exile political activities
POL 32-1 MEX-US: Mexican territorial disputes with the United States
POL 33-1 MEX-US: Mexican-U.S. rivers
POL 36 CUBA: travel control to and from Cuba

Lot Files: These are the special decentralized files of the policymaking level of the Department of State, including the Executive Secretariat, overseas Foreign Service posts, and U.S. special missions. The following Lot Files are located in Record Group 59 at National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.

ARA Files: Lot 62 D 24

Files of the Special Assistant, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs for 1961.

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 63 D 402

Files of the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs for 1961.

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 65 D 256

Files of the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs for 1962.

ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501

Files of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for 1964 including top secret material from 1961-1963.

Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272

Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966, including transcripts of his telephone conversations.

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INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INR/SEE Files: Lot 90 D 321

Latin American files of the Office of Soviet and East European Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the years 1960-1985.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, as well as certain correspondence of the Secretary of State, for 1953-1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163

Exchanges of correspondence between the President with the leaders of the Soviet Union, 1961-1964, the so-called "Pen Pal" correspondence. Also contains drafts of messages and memoranda to the President and Secretary of State about the correspondence.

President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

A chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for 1956-1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192

Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, including texts of speeches and public statements, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330

Memoranda of the Secretary's and Under Secretary's conversations for 1961-1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

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Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147

Records of the Secretary of State's staff meetings, 1961-1963, and additional ad hoc meetings, reports, papers, and memoranda of Chester Bowles' telephone conversations.

S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1945-1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438

Principal Department of State lot file on the Cuban missile crisis, October 1962-January 1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Also contains background material from 1961 and 1962, including documentation on Operation Mon-goose.

S/S Files: Lot 70 D 265

National Security Council meetings, policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961-1965, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316

Department of State copies of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM's) and related materials.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council files, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947-1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State/JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328

Records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1959-1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410

Official and personal files covering the years 1958-1973. Includes files dealing with Johnson's tenure as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1961-1966.

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U.S. Mission to the United Nations Files

NYFRC 84-84-001/002, Secret and Top Secret records of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations with extensive material on the post-missile crisis negotiations.

Central Intelligence Agency

Cuban Files, Job 80-D0167R

DCI Files: Job 54-00499R

Files of the History Staff.

DCI Files: Job 85-00664R

Files of the History Staff, an extensive collection dealing with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

DCI Files: Job 91-00741R

Files of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B0176R

Files of Allen W. Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, 1953-1961.

DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B1285A

Files of John C. McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965.

DDI Files: Job 79-R1012A

The Deputy Directorate for Intelligence's registry of National Intelligence and Special Intelligence estimates

DDI Files: Job 80-R01386R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

DDI Files: Job 89-T01385R:

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence.

DDO/DDP Files: Job 64-00352R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans covering 1960.

DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R

Chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959-1964.

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DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R

Files of the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans covering 1961.

DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 52-00679R

Files of the Covert Collection Staff of the Western Hemisphere Division, including materials prepared for the Taylor Committee and records of Special Group meetings relating to Cuba.

DDO/WH Files: Job 73-00853R

Files dealing with liaison between the Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State, 1955-1966.

HS/HC Files: Job 84-00499R

Central Intelligence Agency History Staff's source collection.

ODDI Registry NIEs and SNIEs: Job 79-R01012A

Copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimate.

O/D/NFAC Files: Job 80-R1386R

Files of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence.

Department of Defense

Office of the Historian, Historian's Office, Secretary of Defense's Cable Files

Telegrams to and from the Secretary of Defense as maintained by the Office of the Historian, Department of Defense.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Herter Papers

Records of Christian A. Herter for 1957-1961.

Project Clean Up Records

Project Clean Up collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, H. Romer McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster.

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White House Office Files

Several White House office collections, including files of the Office of the Staff Secretary, and Project Clean Up, and files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name series, Dulles-Herter series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW Diaries), National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administrative Series, and International File.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File, Country File, Cuba

Rusk Appointment Books

Vice Presidential Security File

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

National Security Files:

Brubeck Series

Chester V. Clifton Series

Countries Series: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Venezuela, USSR

Meetings and Memoranda Series: National Security Council Meetings, Executive Committee Meetings, Standing Group Meetings, National Security Action Memoranda
Regional Series

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President's Appointment Books
President's Office Files: Countries
Presidential Recordings
Staff Memoranda
Papers of George Ball
Papers of Roger Hilsman
Papers of Robert F. Kennedy
Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Papers of Theodore Sorensen

National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Lemnitzer Papers

Papers of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1959-1960; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1961-1962.

Taylor Papers

Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955-1959; Military Advisor to the President 1961-1962; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964.

United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002

Files of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1950 to date.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Records of the Policy Planning Staff for 1957-1961.

S/S Files: Lot 67 D 396

Master file of Guidelines for Policy and Operations prepared by S/P from November 1961 to May 1966.

Task Force on Latin American Files: Lot 61 D 298

Minutes of the Task Force on Latin America for 1961.

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Record Group 323, JFK Collection

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470

Files of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 1961-1968.

OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896

Principal file on the Cuban missile crisis as maintained by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. Includes files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Contains some background documents from the pre-crisis period.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1961.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 3501

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464

Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for 1961.

OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542

Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 77-0131

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreign Policy Files, 1962-1972

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Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

Allen Dulles Papers

Stevenson Papers

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Bowles Papers

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Area Files

Bumpy Road Materials: Papers of Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations, 1955-1961.

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List of Abbreviations

AA, aircraft artillery
AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
AAM, air-to-air missiles
Abn Div, Airborne division
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACSI, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AEW, Aircraft Early Warning Station
AEW&C Det, Airborne Early Warning and Control Detachment
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFB, Air Force Base
AFCIN, Air Force Intelligence
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
A-4D, Skyhawk, U.S. single engine turbojet attack aircraft
AFP, Alliance for Progress
AFTF, Air Force Task Force
AG, Attorney General
AID, Agency for International Development
AJOC, Alternative Joint Communications Center (Air Force)
AJR, Asociacion de Juventud Rebelde (Association of Rebel Youth)
ALTCOMLANT, Alternate Commander, Atlantic (Navy)
Amb., Ambassador
ammo, ammunition
amphib, amphibious
ANG, Air National Guard
AR, American Republics
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CCA, Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CMA, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/RPA, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARC, American Red Cross
Armd Cav Regt, Armored Cavalry Regiment
ARS, aerial reconnaissance and security
ASAP, as soon as possible

ASW, Anti-Submarine Warfare
 AWOL, absent without leave

BLT, Battalion Landing Team
 Bn, battalion
 Brig Hq., Brigade Headquarters
 BW/CW, Biological Warfare/Chemical Warfare

CA, Central America
 CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
 CAP, Combat Air Patrol
 CCA, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
 CEF, Cuban Expeditionary Force
 CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
 CF, Central Files of the Department of State
 CGCONARC, Commanding General, Continental Army Command
 CGUSACARIB, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Caribbean
 CGUSARLANT, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Atlantic
 CGUSCONARC, Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command
 ChiCom, Chinese Communist
 CI, counter-intelligence; counter insurgency
 CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
 CINCAFLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Atlantic
 CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Caribbean
 CINCARLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Atlantic
 CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe
 CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic
 CINCLANTFLT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
 CINCONAD, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
 CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
 CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command
 CJTF, Commander, Joint Task Force
 CMA, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
 CMC, Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
 C.O., Commanding Officer
 COAS, Council of the Organization of American States
 COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of Nations

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COMAFTASKOR, Commander, Air Force Task Force
COMANTDEFCOM, Commander, Antilles Defense Command
COMCARIBSEAFRON, Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier
COMFAIRJAX, Commander, Fleet Air, Jacksonville, Florida
COMINT, Communications Intelligence
COMJTTF, Commander, Joint Task Force
COMKWESTFOR, Commander, Key West Forces
COMNAVBASE GTMO, Commander, Naval Base, Guantamo
COMNAVTF, Commander, Naval Task Force
COMOR, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
COMSECONDFLT, Commander, Second Fleet
COMSTS, Commander, Sea Transportation Service
COMTAC, Commander, Tactical Air Command
CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command
Contel, Consulate telegram
CONUS, continental United States
COSAC, Commanding Officer, Strategic Air Command
CRC, Consejo Revolucionario Cubano, Cuban Revolutionary
Council
CTC, Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos, Confederation of
Cuban Workers
CTG, Commander, Special Task Group
CVA, attack aircraft carrier
CW, chemical warfare

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DD/P, Office of the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intel-
ligence Agency
DEFCON(s), Defense condition(s)
Dels, Delegations
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Dept, Department of State
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIO, District Intelligence Officer
DIRNSA, Director, National Security Agency
Div, Division
DLF, Development Loan Fund
DO, destroyer
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State

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DR, Directorio Revolucionario, Revolutionary Directorate
DRE, Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, Student Revolutionary Directorate
DTG, date-time group (date and exact time on telegrams)
DZ, drop zone

ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA, United Nations Council on Latin America
ELINT, electronic intelligence
Embdes, Embassy despatch
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EMC, electronic countermeasures
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EW, early warning
ExCom, Executive Committee
Eyes Only, document to be read only by individuals with a need-to-know

FA, Field Artillery
FAA, Federal Aviation Agency
FA Bn, Field Artillery Battalion
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMF, Fleet Marine Force
FMFLANT, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
fol, following
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FRC, Federal Records Center
FRO, Frente Revolucionario Democratico, Democratic Revolutionary Front
FROGS, Free Over Ground tactical rockets (Soviet luna rockets)
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

G-2, Army General Staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GNP, gross national product
GOA, Government of Argentina
GOB, Government of Brazil; Government of Bolivia
GOC, Government of Cuba; Government of Chile; Government of Colombia; Good Offices Committee
GOCR, Government of Costa Rica
GOE, Government of Ecuador
GOES, Government of El Salvador
GOF, Government of France
GOG, Government of Guatemala
GOH, Government of Haiti; Government of Honduras
GOJ, Government of Jamaica
GOM, Government of Mexico
GOT, Government of Turkey
GOV, Government of Venezuela
govt, government
GSA, General Services Administration
GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Gtmo, Guantanamo
Guat, Guatemala
GUS, Government of the United States

HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IA, Inter-American
IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
IADB, Inter-American Development Bank
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
ILA, International Longshoreman's Association
ILO, International Labor Organization
IL-28, Soviet jet light bomber
Inf Bde, Infantry Brigade
info, information
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

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INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice
 IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
 IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
 IRBD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
 IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
 Ironbark, special information handling channel for intelligence generated by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
 ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

 JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
 JTF, Joint Task Force
 JURE, Revolutionary Junta

 KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines
 KOMAR, Soviet missile carrying patrol boat
 kts, knots, one nautical mile per hour
 KW, kilowatt

 L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
 LA, Latin America
 LAAM, light anti-aircraft missile
 LAFTA, Latin American Free Trade Association
 LANTCOM, Atlantic Fleet Command
 lat, latitude
 LCI, landing craft, infantry
 LCT, landing craft, tank
 LCU, landing craft, utility
 LCVF, landing craft, vehicle, personnel
 LICROSS, League of International Red Cross Societies
 long, longitude
 LOU, Limited Official Use
 LPH, Landing Platform Helicopter
 LS, Division of Language Services, Department of State
 LSD, landing ship, deck
 LST, landing ship, tank

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MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAG, Marine Aviation Group
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MAR, Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucion, Movement To
Recover the Revolution
MarCorps, Marine Corps
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MC, memorandum of conversation
MDC, Movimiento Democratico Cristiano, Christian Democratic
Movement
MEB, Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF, Marine Expeditionary Force
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFM, Meeting of Foreign Ministers
MIG, Soviet-made fighter aircraft
MLF, multilateral force
mort., mortar
MP, Member of Parliament (British)
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MRP, Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, People's Revolu-
tionary Movement
MSTS, Military Sea Transport Service
MTB, motor torpedo boat
mtg, meeting

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAD, Naval Air Detachment
NAS, Naval Air Station
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NavAide, Naval Aide
NDU, National Defense University
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Depart-
ment of State
niact, night action, telegram indicator requiring immediate ac-
tion
Nic, Nicaragua
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
nm, nautical miles
Noform, no foreign distribution
NORAD, North American Air Defense Command
NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO, National Reconnaissance Office
NSA, National Security Agency

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NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
 NSC, National Security Council
 NSF, National Security Files
 NY, New York
 NYFRC, New York Federal Records Center

OAD, Organization of American States
 OARS, Ocean Area Reconnaissance Satellite
 OAS, Organization of American States
 OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
 OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
 OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
 OD, operating directive
 OECD, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
 OEP, Office of Emergency Planning
 ONE-OCI, Office of National Estimates/Office of Current Intelligence
 OP, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; operations plan
 OPLAN, operations plan
 OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
 PAA, Pan American Airways
 PACOM, Pacific Command
 PC, Patrol Craft, Submarine chaser
 P.L.-480, Public Law 480, Food for Peace
 PM, Prime Minister; paramilitary
 PNG, persona non grata
 POE, port of embarkation
 POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
 Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State
 POW, prisoner of war
 Pres, President
 PSP, Partido Socialista Popular, Popular Socialist Party (Cuban Communist Party)
 PT, motor torpedo boat

R, resolution; Republican
 re, regarding

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recco, reconnaissance
reps, representatives
res, resolution
RLT, Regimental Landing Team
RPA, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau
of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
RPM, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Depart-
ment of State

SA, Sterling Area
SA-2, Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM)
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue
SATS, short airfield for tactical support
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCCS, Special Consultative Committee on Security (OAS)
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecNav, Secretary of the Navy
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State
or his party to Washington
SIGINT, Signals Intelligence
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/O, Operations Center, Department of State
Sov, Soviet
S/P Policy Planning Council/Staff
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SS-4, Soviet medium-range ballistic missile
SS-5, Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile
SSM, surface-to-surface missile
Stat., United States Statutes at Large
SW, surface warfare
SYG, Secretary General of the United Nations

TAC, Tactical Air Command
TAD, Tactical Air Defense
TAF, Tactical Air Force
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuz (Tele-
graph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TCS, Tactical Control Squadron
telcon, telephone conversation

TF, Task Force
 TFS, Tactical Fighter Squadron
 TG, Task Group
 T/O, Table of Organization
 T/O&E, Table of Organization and Estimates
 Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 TRS, Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

 U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
 U-2, U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
 UAR, United Arab Republic
 UDT, Underwater Demolition Team
 UDU, Underwater Demolition Unit
 UK, United Kingdom
 UN, United Nations
 UNESCO-ECLA, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-Economic Commission for Latin America
 UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
 UNMIS, United Nations Mission
 UNSC, United Nations Security Council
 UR, Unidad Revolucionario (Cuban political movement)
 urtel, your telegram
 USA, United States Army
 USAF, United States Air Force
 USDel, United States Delegation
 USG, United States Government
 USIA, United States Information Agency
 USIB, United States Intelligence Board
 USMC, United States Marine Corps
 USN, United States Navy
 USRO, United States Mission to European Regional Organization in Paris
 USS, United States Ship
 USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 USSTRICOM, United States Strike Command
 UST, United States Treaties and other International Agreements
 USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
 UW, unconventional warfare

 VOA, Voice of America
 VS, Search Plane; Shore-based Search Squadron

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WH, White House

W/T, wireless transmitter

WNRC, Washington National Records Center

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List of Persons

Alessandri Rodríguez, Jorge, President of Chile
Allende Gossens, Salvador, Senator (Socialist Party, Chile) and candidate of the Frente de Accion Popular for President in the 1964 elections
Amory, Robert, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Anderson, Admiral George W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until August 1, 1963
Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio, President of Ecuador November 1961-July 1963
Attwood, William, Ambassador to Guinea March 29, 1961-May 27, 1963

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February-December 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State
Barnes, C. Tracy, Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action, Central Intelligence Agency
Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary March-May 1962
Beerli, Colonel Stanley W., Chief of Air Operations, Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Bell, John O., Ambassador to Guatemala after November 10, 1961
Berbaum, M. Maurice, Ambassador to Ecuador
Berle, Adolph A., Chairman of the Department of State Task Force on Latin America
Betencourt, Rómulo, President of Venezuela
Bissell, Richard M., Jr., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until February 1962
Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France after September 4, 1962
Bowles, Chester A., Under Secretary of State, January-December 1961; thereafter Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs
Brubeck, William H., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, August 1961-May 1962; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary, May 1962-July 1963

Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations until August 1961
Burris, Colonel Howard L., Military Aide to Vice President Johnson
Burrows, Charles R., Ambassador to Honduras
Bustamente, Sir Alexander, Premier of the British Colony of Jamaica after April 10, 1962; Prime Minister of independent Jamaica after August 6, 1962

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until January 1962
Carroll, Joseph F., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from April 1962
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Prime Minister of Cuba
Castro Ruz, Raul, Minister of the Armed Forces of Cuba
Chase, Gordon, National Security Council Staff member
Chayes, Abram J., Legal Advisor, Department of State from February 1961
Clark, Rear Admiral John E., Commander of Special Task Group 81.8
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Clifton, General Chester V., USA, Military Aide to President Kennedy
Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence after April 23, 1962
Coerr, Wymerley DeR., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Cole, Charles W., Ambassador to Chile after September 22, 1961
Cottrell, Sterling J., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State after January 1963
Craig, Brigadier General William H., Department of Defense Project Officer for Operation Mongoose until June 1962
Crimmins, John H., Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until February 1962; thereafter Director of the Office

Dearborn, Henry, Counselor at the Embassy at Bogota
 Decker, General George H., Army Chief of Staff
 de Gaulle, General Charles, President of France
 Dennison, Admiral Robert L., USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic
 Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury
 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States after March 1962
 Donovan, James B., New York lawyer involved in efforts to secure the release of prisoners captured at the Bay of Pigs
 Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961
 Dungan, Ralph A. Special Assistant to the President
 Durán Neumann, Julio, Senator (Radical Party, Chile) and candidate of the Democratic Front for President in the 1964 elections

Earman, J. S., Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence until April 1962
 Echandi Jiménez, Mario, President of Costa Rica until May 8, 1962
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States until January 20, 1961
 Elder, Walter, Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence from April 1962
 Esterline, J. D., Chief of Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Finletter, Thomas K., Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 Fitzgerald, Desmond, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
 Fomin, Aleksandr S., Counselor to Soviet Embassy in the United States
 Freeman, Fulton, Ambassador to Colombia after May 4, 1961
 Frei Montalva, Eduardo, Senator (Christian Democrat party, Chile) and Christian Democratic candidate for President in the 1964 elections

Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 1961
 Glenn, Edmund S., Language Services, Department of State

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- Goodwin, Richard N., Assistant Special Counsel to the President until November 1961; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Gray, Major General David W., Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Gromyko, Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Guevara de la Serna, Major Ernesto (Che), Cuban Minister of Industry
- Hamilton, Fowler, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, September 30-December 20, 1961
- Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large, February-December 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs December 1961-April 1963; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1963
- Harris, Brigadier General Benjamin T., Department of Defense Project Officer for Operation Mongoose from June 1962
- Harvey, William K., Chief of Task Force W, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency; Project Officer for Operation Mongoose
- Hawkins, Colonel Jack, Chief of Paramilitary Operations, Branch 4, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Helms, Richard M., Chief of Operations, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until February 1962; thereafter Deputy Director for Plans
- Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1961
- Howard, Lisa, correspondent, American Broadcasting Company
- Hurwitch, Robert A., Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until February 1962; Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, February-June 1962; Special Assistant for Cuban Affairs, June 1962-June 1963; Deputy Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State, January 1963-August 1963
- Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States until November 22, 1963; thereafter President
- Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Assistant Attorney General 1961-1962; thereafter Deputy Attorney General

Kaysen, Carl, member, National Security Council Staff, June-December 1961; thereafter Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States until his assassination on November 22, 1963

Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States from January 1961

Kent, Sherman, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency

Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

King, Colonel J. C., Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from September 1962

Komer, Robert W., member, National Security Council Staff

Kuznetsov, Vasiliy V., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Lansdale, Brigadier General Edward G., Deputy Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense until May 1961; thereafter Assistant for Special Operations; also Chief of Operations for Operation Mongoose after November 1961

Lechin, Juan, Vice President of Bolivia

Legere, Colonel Lawrence J., Assistant to the President's Military Representative

LeMay, General Curtis, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to September 1962

Lleras Camargo, Alvaro, President of Colombia until August 7, 1962

López Arellano, Oswaldo, Head of the Military Junta of Honduras after October 4, 1963

López Mateos, Alfonso, President of Mexico

Lundahl, Arthur C., Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency

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Foreign Relations of the United States"

McCloy, John J., Presidential advisor and Chairman of the Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Negotiations Over Cuba at the United Nations

McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 1961

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister until October 20, 1963

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 1961

Manley, Norman, Premier of the British Colony of Jamaica until April 10, 1962

Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until April 1961; Ambassador to Mexico from May 1961

Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until May 1962; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Mendelevich, Lev I., Head, Latin American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Miró Cardona, José, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

Morales-Carrion, Arturo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from February 1961

Muccio, John J., Ambassador to Guatemala until November 10, 1961

Murrow, Edward R., Director, United States Information Agency

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs January 1961-November 29, 1963; thereafter Secretary of the Navy

O'Donnell, P. Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President

Orlich Bolmarcich, Francisco José, President of Costa Rica after May 8, 1962

Parrott, Thomas A., Executive Secretary, Special Group, National Security Council

Paz Estenssoro, Victor, President of Bolivia

Peralta, Azurcho, Colonel Enrique, Head of the Military Junta of Guatemala after March 31, 1963

Plimpton, Francis T.P., Deputy Representative to the United Nations and the Security Council

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Rivera Carballo, Julio Adalberto, President of El Salvador after July 1, 1962
Roa Garcia, Raul, Cuban Minister for External Relations
Rostow, Walt W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until December 1961; thereafter Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 1961

San Roman, Jose Perez, Commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force Brigade
Scali, John, correspondent, American Broadcasting Company
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President
Scott, Joseph W., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Shoup, General David M., Commandant of the Marine Corps
Smith, Bromley, Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council until August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary
Somozo Debayle, General Anastasio, Commander in Chief of the National Guard of Nicaragua
Somozo Debayle, Luis, President of Nicaragua until May 1963
Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Counsel to the President
Stephansky, Ben S., Ambassador to Bolivia, June 14, 1961–October 15, 1963
Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 1961
Strom, Carl W., Ambassador to Bolivia until May 8, 1961

Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Chairman of the Cuba Study Group, April–June 1961; President's Military Representative July 1961–October 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Telles, Raymond, Ambassador to Costa Rica after April 6, 1961
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until July 1962; Ambassador at Large, Department of State, after October 3, 1962
Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Valencia, Guillermo León, President of Colombia after August 7, 1962

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Vance, Cyrus R., General Counsel of the Department of Defense, January 29, 1961-June 30, 1962; Secretary of the Army after July 5, 1962

Velasco Ibarra, José Maria, President of Ecuador until November 7, 1961

Villeda Morales, José Ramón, President of Honduras until October 4, 1963

Wheeler, General Earle G., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

White, General Thomas D., Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 1961

Williams, Murat W., Ambassador to El Salvador after January 17, 1961

Wilson, Donald, Acting Director of the U.S. Information Agency

Woodward, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, July 1961-March 1962

Ydigoras Fuentes, General Miguel, President of Guatemala until March 31, 1963

Yost, Charles W., Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council

Zorin, Valerian, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations

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Summary of Print Volume X

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962. Parenthetical citations are to the numbered documents in the text. Volume X, published in 1997, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

By the time John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency on January 20, 1961, U.S.-Cuban relations had become locked in a state of mutual hostility. The final act of the Eisenhower administration with regard to Cuba was to sever diplomatic relations. (2, 4, 6, 7, 8) The Kennedy administration expanded upon and continued this policy by seeking to isolate, contain, undermine, and overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. The Castro government was seen in Washington as a client of the Soviet Union, with the dangerous potential of fostering Communist subversion and spreading Soviet influence throughout Latin America.

Background

Following his election in November 1960, President Kennedy had been briefed in general terms about the CIA covert plan to support an attempt by Cuban émigrés to overthrow the Castro government. The plan was authorized by President Eisenhower and developed by the CIA during 1960. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1958–1960, Volume VI) On January 19, 1961, President Eisenhower met with President-elect Kennedy, and briefed him on various foreign policy concerns. Eisenhower made reference to the small force of Cuban émigrés that was being trained by the CIA in Guatemala, and recommended that the effort be continued and accelerated. Eisenhower added that, in his opinion, the United States could not allow the Castro government to continue to exist in Cuba. (22)

CIA Invasion Plan and Its Critics

The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed several members of the new administration on the CIA's Cuba project on January 22, and the JCS met with President Kennedy on January 25 to discuss the implications of the proposed covert operation against Cuba. (24, 26) General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, advised the President that time was working against the United States in Cuba, where Castro was tightening police state controls. Exist-

ing U.S. plans, he stated, called for the establishment of a government in exile, the introduction of anti-Castro guerrilla forces into Cuba, and subsequent support of the guerrilla forces by U.S. military forces. Plans were ready, he told the President, for such action. (26) On January 27, however, the Joint Chiefs provided Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara an assessment of the CIA's plan to overthrow the Castro government in which they stated that the plan "does not assure the accomplishment of the objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate." (28)

McNamara and General Lemnitzer took up the JCS concerns in a meeting with the President on January 28, attended by a number of other concerned officials. (30, 31) During the meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated that the Department of State saw grave political dangers for the U.S. position throughout the Western Hemisphere if the Kennedy administration approved overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States. As a result of the January 28 meeting at the White House, President Kennedy requested a reassessment of the existing plans for an effort to overthrow the Castro government, the first of several reassessments required by the President.

Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer expressed skepticism about the CIA plan following the January 28 meeting. Both agreed that the plan required careful study. (32) On February 3, the JCS submitted to McNamara a military evaluation of the CIA Para-Military plan, which was then focused on introducing a Cuban émigré brigade around the port of Trinidad. (35) The JCS judged that the Trinidad beachhead offered the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the stated objective. But they noted: "Since the success of this operation is dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation is made." The JCS concluded that, if significant local support for the assault forces developed within the first 2 days, "timely execution of the plan has a fair chance of ultimate success." They noted, however, that their information regarding the capabilities of the proposed assault force came from second and third hand sources. In order to advise the President properly, they felt that a team of military officers should be dispatched to Guatemala to assess the preparations.

The JCS evaluation was discussed by President Kennedy and his closest advisers on February 8. (40) Kennedy focused on a fall-back option incorporated in the planning for the invasion. That option stipulated that if the invasion failed in its initial phase to unseat the Castro government, the invaders could fade into the Escambray mountains and join other guerrilla groups fighting against Castro. The fall-back option was specifically cited in the February 8 meeting and made the invasion proposal more palatable for the President. But he still pressed for alternatives to a full-fledged invasion supported by U.S. planes, ships, and supplies. It became increasingly clear in the course of the numerous reviews of the plan prepared for the President that he was leery of a proposal that threatened to draw the United States openly into war. But he was eager to see the Castro government overthrown, and did not want to have to face the political embarrassment of disbanding the Cuban émigré army and being accused of throwing away perhaps the last good opportunity of preventing Cuba from being lost to Communist control.

CIA officials contended that the Agency's plan was sound. On February 17, Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans of the CIA and the motive force behind the planning for the invasion, prepared a memorandum that argued for the program planned by the CIA for a landing in force in the Trinidad area. He noted that Castro's position in Cuba was becoming stronger every day, and contended that soon it would be impossible to unseat him without drastic and politically untenable actions such as an all-out embargo or the use of overt military force. (46) Bissell argued his position in a meeting at the White House on February 18. He was opposed by Secretary of State Rusk, who contended that it would be better to delay any action and attempt to build up OAS support. (48) The President required further work on the plan.

Revised Invasion Plans

Reevaluation led to significant changes in the invasion plan. On March 10, the JCS submitted an evaluation prepared by three officers who went to Guatemala to inspect the combat-capability of the émigré army. Their findings were generally positive in terms of equipment, training, and morale. The small army of approximately 1,000 men would be heavily outnumbered, however, and the logistics specialist concluded that

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logistic preparations were not adequate. Nonetheless, the team concluded that the invasion army could be ready to fight by April 1. (56) Bissell followed with a memorandum on March 11 that argued that it would be "infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April." (58) At a meeting at the White House on March 11, however, President Kennedy indicated that, although he was willing to take the chance of going ahead, he could not endorse a plan that involved the United States so openly. He directed the development of a plan where U.S. assistance would be less obvious. (59)

Working under intense time pressure, the CIA produced a plan on March 15 targeted upon a sparsely populated area of swampland along the south coast of Cuba at a place called the Bay of Pigs, approximately 100 miles west of Trinidad. The change of target was necessary in order to encompass an airstrip adequate for B-26 bombers, so that air support for the invasion would seem to come from within Cuba. The plan relied on a landing begun under cover of darkness, and completed in the early hours after dawn. (61) The JCS evaluated the prospects for the success of a landing at the Bay of Pigs and concluded that, although prospects for the Trinidad plan were better, the Bay of Pigs alternative was considered "feasible." They noted, however, that "inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace." (62) At a meeting on March 15, President Kennedy directed that the entire landing operation should be completed before dawn, so that the ships could be well away from shore by dawn, and the operation could be represented as a domestic guerrilla uprising. (65) The revisions of this plan, code-named Zapata, were completed by the CIA on March 16, and the President approved the revised plan, but reserved the right to call it off up to 24 hours prior to the landing. (66)

During a meeting at the White House on March 29, a tentative date for the invasion was set for April 10. President Kennedy asked whether, in the event the invasion failed, the invading force could melt into the surrounding countryside and function as guerrillas, as had been assumed with earlier versions of the plan. Bissell replied that in the event of failure at the Bay of Pigs the entire invading force would have to be withdrawn. (74) On April 4, Senator William Fulbright was invited to a meeting to discuss the plan. Senator Fulbright spoke out against the enterprise but the President's other advisers in the meeting

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supported it. (80) On April 6, the time for the invasion was rescheduled for April 17, with the President retaining the option of canceling the operation 24 hours before it began. (84)

The JCS issued instructions on April 7 to Admiral Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, concerning destroyer escort and combat air patrol to protect the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF), which was preparing to sail for Cuba. (85) Dennison, in turn, issued his Operation Order for the operation on April 10 to Rear Admiral John E. Clark, who commanded Special Task Group 81.8 (STG 81.8), which was assigned to support the CEF. (87) Clark was instructed: "DD's [destroyers] will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area." With those limitations, and similar instructions concerning the necessity to avoid involving U.S. air cover in open combat with Castro's air force, the CEF was left to fight essentially alone, with only cover from the B-26 bombers of the small émigré air force, launched from a base in Nicaragua in support of the landings.

President Kennedy's lingering doubts concerning the success of the Cuban invasion force were largely allayed by a telegram on April 13 from Marine Colonel Jack Hawkins, the principal military adviser assigned to help prepare the Cuban brigade in Guatemala. Hawkins expressed no doubts when asked to evaluate the brigade's chances: "My observations the last few days have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions but also the ultimate objective of Castro's overthrow." He described the brigade leaders as very confident, and added: "I share their confidence." (98) Based on the confidence of the CIA officials managing the operation, President Kennedy allowed it to go forward as scheduled.

The Invasion

On April 15, a preliminary air strike was launched against Cuban airfields by B-26 bombers bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force. The object of this attack by the Cuban émigré air force was to destroy Castro's air force on the ground before the invasion was launched. (103) This air strike only partially succeeded, and it had the effect of removing much of the element of surprise from the subsequent invasion. A critical decision affecting the possibility of success for the Bay of Pigs operation was taken on April 16 when President Kennedy decided,

on the basis of advice from Secretary of State Rusk, that the air strikes scheduled for the morning of April 17 to support the invasion, would have to be postponed until the airfield at the Bay of Pigs could be secured and the strikes launched from there. CIA Deputy Director General C. P. Cabell, along with Richard Bissell, protested the decision to McGeorge Bundy, who told them that they would have to discuss the matter with Rusk. Secretary Rusk explained the political considerations underlying the decision and offered to let them speak directly to the President about the matter. The CIA officials decided that there was no point in pressing the matter that far. (108) The second strike against Cuban air fields, planned to eliminate the remainder of Castro's air force, did not take place as planned. When the invasion began at the Bay of Pigs on the morning of April 17, the Cuban Government still had the air power to cripple it.

The invasion of Cuba by the Cuban brigade at the Bay of Pigs was in trouble almost from the beginning. After Action reports by Grayston Lynch and William Robertson of the CIA, who were directly involved in the invasion, provide a graphic picture of the breakdown of the invasion, after initial, limited success on the morning of April 17. (109, 110) The lack of effective air support left the Cuban brigade, and the supporting transports of the CEF easy prey for the remaining planes of the Cuban Air Force. T-33 jet training planes were particularly effective against the B-26 bombers of the CEF's air force when they appeared over the beach. Meanwhile, the instructions from the JCS to Admiral Dennison were to keep fleet units well off the Cuban coast, and to provide an air cap for CEF shipping only when it was outside Cuban territorial waters. (111) As a result, the CIA had to report to the JCS at 10:17 a.m. on April 17 that two of the ships of the CEF, the *Rio Escondido* and the *Houston*, had been sunk, and that a third, the *Blagar*, was under heavy attack. (112) By the afternoon of April 17, the CIA reported that the *Barbara J* and the *Atlantico* were also under attack off the coast of Cuba, and that the *Barbara J* was on fire. (116) Much of the necessary supplies and ammunition for the Cuban brigade were lost in the ships sunk at the Bay of Pigs. The remaining vessels of the CEF fled out to sea, and were only regrouped with difficulty.

Reports from the Cuban brigade ashore constituted a steady stream of pleas for air cover, ammunition, and supplies to ward off mounting pressure on the beachhead from Castro forces,

supported by tanks and jets. During the morning hours of April 18, messages from the brigade commander became increasingly desperate. "Request jet support or cannot hold." "Have no ammo left for tanks and very little left for troops." "Enemy just launched heavy land attack supported by tanks. Cannot hold for long." "Red Beach wiped out. Request air strikes immediately." (125) By that afternoon, the brigade commander radioed that without jet cover his force could not survive: "Please don't desert us. Am out of tank and bazooka ammo. Tanks will hit me at dawn. I will not be evacuated. Will fight to the end if we have to." (135)

During the early morning hours of April 19, an assessment of the disaster occurring at the Bay of Pigs took place at the White House. After the meeting with the President, the JCS sent instructions to Admiral Dennison to furnish U.S. air cover by six unmarked jet fighters over the CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time. The U.S. fighters were not authorized to attack ground targets, but were given latitude to destroy the Cuban Air Force if it appeared and engaged. (140) The air cover would permit CEF transport aircraft to fly in desperately needed supplies, and to attack the tanks and ground forces mustered by Castro around the beachhead. Unfortunately, the order sent to the CEF air base in Nicaragua also stipulated local time for the strike by CEF bombers, but local time in Nicaragua was one hour earlier than at the Bay of Pigs. (150) The CEF planes passed over Admiral Clark's Task Group just as he was preparing to put the authorized air cover into the air. The Navy jets followed the CEF bombers to the beachhead as quickly as possible, but by the time they arrived, jets from Castro's air force had already broken up and driven off the CEF attack. That represented the last opportunity to try to salvage the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ironically, intelligence reports subsequently indicated that Fidel Castro himself was leading the tank column pressing the attack on the Cuban brigade. (236) Instead, the morning of April 19 concluded with a last desperate signal from the brigade commander at the Bay of Pigs: "Out of ammunition. Men fighting in water. If no help given Blue Beach lost." (146)

The Taylor Study Group

The collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion forced the Kennedy administration to take responsibility for an embarrassing and damaging failure, while U.S. Naval forces off the Bay of Pigs

scrambled to try to rescue as many survivors from the Cuban brigade as possible. (151, 156, 177) The failure was followed by a determined effort in Washington to find out what went wrong. President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor, retired Army Chief of Staff, to head a committee composed of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, to investigate the failure, and to make recommendations concerning future U.S. capability of conducting similar operations. Taylor's Cuban Study Group conducted an intensive investigation, which involved gathering information and interviewing key participants across a period of a month and a half following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The interviews offered detailed insight into the lack of adequate planning, coordination, and oversight which helped to undermine the operation. (169, 174, 175, 176, 187, 193, 199, 200, 201, 209, 210, 221)

The Study Group met with President Kennedy on May 16 to give him a preliminary report concerning the investigation. (218, 219) The Study Group submitted its formal report to the President on June 13. (229-234) The Group found in its conclusions that, contrary to the President's much-quoted statement to the press in taking responsibility for the collapse at the Bay of Pigs, this failure was not in fact an orphan, but had a variety of fathers. The Study Group felt that before the operation became the responsibility of the Kennedy administration, it should have been canceled by the Eisenhower administration or converted into an amphibious operation under the direction of the Department of Defense. When it was presented to the Kennedy administration as a well-advanced project, those in charge of the operation "did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the Government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions." In approving the operation, the Group noted, the President and his senior officials were "greatly influenced by the understanding that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status, if unable to hold the beachhead." That projection proved to be false. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not do an adequate job in assessing the military feasibility of the operation for the President, and gave the impression of approving the Zapata plan, despite reservations. And the Group concluded that it was a mistake to try to run the operation from Washington, rather than

entrusting responsibility to a commander closer to the point of combat. (233)

Reassessment of Cuba Policy

While the Taylor Study Group was conducting its investigation into the causes of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration reassessed its Cuba policy in light of the failure. The process began on April 20 with a grim Cabinet meeting in which the President and his advisers took stock of the shambles of their effort to unseat Fidel Castro. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles attended and recorded: "The President was really quite shattered.... Here for the first time he faced a situation where his judgment had been mistaken, in spite of the fact that week after week of conferences had taken place before he gave the green light." The mood in the Cabinet was "almost savage" Bowles observed, "as everyone appeared to be jumping on everyone else." (158) The cabinet meeting was followed on April 22 by an angry NSC meeting. Bowles recorded that Robert Kennedy took the lead in the meeting, "slamming into anyone who suggested that we go slowly and try to move calmly and not repeat previous mistakes." The atmosphere, Bowles noted, "was almost as emotional as the Cabinet meeting two days earlier, the difference being that on this occasion the emphasis was on specific proposals to harass Castro." (166) The upshot was a series of decisions by President Kennedy which spoke of his desire to find a new approach to undermine Castro's control of Cuba, and prevent the spread of the Cuban revolution to Latin America. The President asked for a reassessment of U.S. support for guerrilla activities in Cuba. He instructed the Departments of State and Defense to study the question of training Cuban soldiers within the United States armed forces. He authorized the creation of an interdepartmental study group to consider an increase in U.S. assistance to Latin American countries for internal security and counter-guerrilla activities, and, in the same vein, directed that the possibility of creating a Caribbean Security Agency be studied, to provide a pool of forces to counter Cuban subversion. (167) The effect of the President's directives was to put in train a comprehensive review of Cuba policy.

The policy review culminated in a paper prepared for the National Security Council on May 4 by an Interagency Task Force. (202) The paper, entitled "Cuba and Communism in the

Hemisphere," formed the basis for an NSC discussion on May 5. (204) The result of the discussion was an NSC Record of Action that outlined Cuba policy in the wake of the Bay of Pigs failure. The fundamental object of policy was listed first: "Agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action." Among the agreed measures was the conclusion that the United States should not take military action against Cuba for the present, "but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future." It was noted that the President was concerned to receive timely intelligence concerning Cuban military capabilities, and the enhancement of those capabilities by military assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, "so that U.S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level." The President directed the CIA to make a detailed study of "possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba," and he agreed that relations with the Cuban émigré Revolutionary Council "should be improved and made more open." No separate Cuban military force could be organized in the United States, but Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. And it was agreed that the United States "should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of the other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro." (205) Castro may have won the battle of the Bay of Pigs, but the Kennedy administration was determined that he would not win the war to introduce and expand Communist influence and control in Latin America.

Operation Mongoose

The reassessment of Cuba policy begun in May eventuated in the authorization by President Kennedy on November 3, 1961, of the development of a new program designed to undermine the Castro government in Cuba. The program was codenamed Operation Mongoose. Overall control of the operation was entrusted to a new group established for the purpose, called the Special Group (Augmented), a slightly expanded version of the NSC 5412 Special Group, which oversaw covert operations. The Special Group (Augmented) consisted of regular Special Group members McGeorge Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson,

Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, augmented by Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were not regular members of the group, they occasionally attended meetings. President Kennedy appointed Taylor as chairman of the group, but Robert Kennedy was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President. Air Force Brigadier General Edward Lansdale was appointed Chief of Operations and coordinated the CIA's Mongoose operations with those within the Departments of State and Defense. Within the CIA, the Mongoose operation was run by Task Force W, under the direction of William Harvey, with overall guidance from Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented). (270)

Initial discussions within the Special Group (Augmented) on the scope and direction of Operation Mongoose led to decisions confirmed by the President on November 30. (272, 275, 278) The decisions confirmed Lansdale's role as Chief of Operations, and provided the green light from the President to go ahead with the operation as conceived on November 3, "in order to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime." The first review of progress on the project was set for two weeks from the date of the November 30 memorandum of decision. In a meeting on December 1, called to discuss Mongoose plans, Attorney General Kennedy stressed that the President had reached a decision to accord higher priority to the Cuba problem. General Lansdale reported that he had surveyed all of the resources available for the project. He concluded that there were sizable active and potential resources available, but there was "a very difficult job ahead." He stressed the importance of coming to an agreement as to the future of Cuba after Castro, so that appeals to potential resistance groups could be geared to a positive long-range program. (280)

A measure of the Kennedy administration's renewed determination to eliminate Castro was the reauthorization of assassination attempts on the Cuban Premier. Efforts had been made to assassinate Castro before the Bay of Pigs invasion in coordination with underworld figures from the Mafia, but those efforts had been suspended during the reassessment of Cuba policy following the Bay of Pigs. (337)

During the course of his summary remarks to the National Security Council on January 18, 1962, concerning foreign policy

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and national security problems, President Kennedy said: "The time has not yet come when we must force a solution to the Cuban problem." (290) On the same day, however, General Lansdale circulated a program review of the "Cuba Project" to the Special Group (Augmented) which stated: "The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace." (291) The Mongoose Operation, as outlined by Lansdale in this document, looked to the development of a "political action organization" in being in key localities in Cuba to facilitate a popular uprising against Castro when it occurred. Lansdale noted that the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation had eroded severely the confidence of the Cuban resistance movement in United States competence and intentions, and that confidence would have to be reestablished. Lansdale anticipated that the revolt, when it came, would come from "an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both." He added that it would be a major goal of the project to bring this about. For the initial phase of the project, Lansdale called upon the agencies which were involved—State, Defense, CIA, and USIA—to draw up plans to begin to move toward the goal of fomenting revolt in Cuba. On January 19, Attorney General Kennedy met with Lansdale and the Mongoose operations officers in the CIA and Defense to stress the importance of the project. He said that the project carried "the top priority in the United States Government—all else is secondary—no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared." The Attorney General quoted the President as saying that "the final chapter on Cuba has not been written." (292)

On February 20, Lansdale circulated a second review of planning for the Mongoose operation in which he noted: "Time is running against us." The Cuban people, he noted, felt helpless and were "losing hope fast." Accordingly, Lansdale outlined a program of action which he felt it was essential to push forward according to a timetable he outlined. The timetable called for preliminary action on the project to begin in March, leading to guerrilla operations in August and September, followed by open revolt during the first two weeks of October. A decision critical to the success of such a program was still to be made, and Lansdale urged the Special Group (Augmented) to consider it:

"If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt?" (304) That was the fundamental question which confronted the Kennedy administration throughout the Mongoose exercise.

Phase I

The Special Group (Augmented) considered Lansdale's proposed plan on February 21, discussed it again with McNamara on February 26, and finally concluded on March 1 that it was essential to conduct an initial intelligence collection program before deciding whether to proceed with the operational proposals outlined by Lansdale. A target date of the end of May was established for a review of the situation in light of the intelligence efforts. A decision as to the next phase would be made at that time. (309) On March 14, this decision was confirmed in guidelines for Operation Mongoose approved by the President. The guidelines stipulated that the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area." Political, economic, and covert actions were authorized "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention." Those rather cautious guidelines were prefaced, however, by an initial assumption which stated that: "In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention." That stated assumption, in guidelines drafted by General Taylor and approved by the President, makes it appear that the Kennedy administration had decided, by mid-March, to intervene militarily in Cuba to ensure the overthrow of the Castro government. That impression is reinforced later in the guidelines by an instruction to the JCS to "continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention." A handwritten covering memorandum by U. Alexis Johnson, dated March 16, found attached to a copy of the guidelines in Department of State files, throws a different light on the guidelines, however. Johnson, who attended the meeting at which the President approved the guidelines, wrote: "The President also expressed skepticism that in so

far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action. It was clearly understood no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed." (314) Despite the stated assumption at the outset of the guidelines, the President clearly still had not decided whether to use U.S. military force to overthrow Castro.

On March 21, the intelligence community produced NIE 85-62, entitled "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba." The intelligence estimate concluded, in part, that, while there was active resistance in Cuba, it was "limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate," and that the Cuban regime, "with all the power of repression at its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity." The estimate also concluded: "The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. They are grumbling and resentful, but apparently hopeless and passive, resigned to acceptance of the present regime as the effective government in being with which they must learn to live for lack of a feasible alternative." (315)

The intelligence appreciation outlined in NIE 85-62 was viewed as far too negative by Lansdale and others, such as Richard Goodwin of the White House staff, who were involved in the Mongoose exercise. They saw evidence of cracks in the Castro government in Castro's denunciation, on March 26, of Cuban Communist Party leader Anibal Escalante and other Communist "militants". (320) They looked for opportunities to exploit the apparent divisions in Castro's ranks. (334, 339) The intelligence available at the time of the review of Phase I of Operation Mongoose on July 25, suggested, however, that Castro was in the process of consolidating his control over Cuban society. Cuba faced a significant economic crisis, but the Soviet bloc countries were expected to carry Cuba through the crisis, and to continue to contribute to the military build-up in Cuba which was making Castro's position increasingly secure. (349)

In his assessment of Phase I, submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) on July 25, Lansdale took issue with the intelligence appreciations and argued that there were enough able-bodied and motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to initiate a successful revolt against Castro. But he added that they would require strong support from the United States, and he ex-

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pressed the concern that "time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba." In Lansdale's opinion, it was time for the United States to do more than "watch and talk". If the anti-Castro Cubans did not receive clear leadership from the United States, Lansdale's feeling was that "they will make other plans for the future." Lansdale outlined four options for Phase II of Operation Mongoose: the first called for the cancellation of the operation, the second for the application of all pressures on the Castro regime short of the use of U.S. military force, and the final two contemplated the use of military force by the United States. (360)

Phase II

The Special Group (Augmented) responded to Lansdale's suggestions by instructing him to produce an outline plan of action based upon an enhanced version of the second option, calling for all actions which could be undertaken to undermine the Castro government, short of U.S. military intervention. Lansdale was instructed, however, to try to keep the "noise level" to a minimum. (367, 378) Lansdale submitted an outline plan for Phase II to the Special Group (Augmented) on August 14. (374) In a memorandum to the President on August 17, General Taylor noted that the Special Group (Augmented) had reviewed the results of Phase I, the intelligence gathering phase of Operation Mongoose, and, while not yet satisfied with the level of intelligence achieved, the group was prepared to recommend that the President approve the operational plans outlined by Lansdale for Phase II. The operation would continue to focus on the need for additional intelligence concerning the possibility of a successful revolt against Castro. But it was judged to be time to move forward with efforts designed "to hurt the local regime as much as possible on the economic front and work further to discredit the regime locally and abroad." The group felt that the new course of action would create added difficulties for the Castro government, and would increase the visibility of its failures, but added "there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthrow of the regime from within." With the clear understanding that Phase II would still limit Operation Mongoose to activities short of anything likely to draw the United States into active military operations against Cuba, President Kennedy on August 20 gave his approval to proceed. (380)

Toward the Missile Crisis

By August, Operation Mongoose had taken on a new sense of urgency as evidence mounted that the Soviet Union had sharply increased military shipments to Cuba. (382, 383, 390) At an August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), CIA Director McCone expressed his concern that the Soviet Union would underwrite its investment in Cuba by installing medium-range ballistic missiles on the island. (371) On August 23, President Kennedy considered the new evidence of Soviet bloc activity in Cuba and issued a series of directives incorporated in NSAM No. 181. One of those directives stipulated that Operation Mongoose Plan B plus should be developed "with all possible speed." In addition, the President directed that a study be made of the various alternatives which could be adopted to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack upon the United States. And he called for another study of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion "or other action beyond Mongoose B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis." (385, 386)

Aerial photography established on August 29 that the Soviet Union was building surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles raised the stakes in Washington, where there was concern that the purpose of the anti-aircraft missiles might be to protect the subsequent introduction of ballistic missiles. (395) On August 31, McGeorge Bundy assessed for President Kennedy the increased threat that Soviet medium-range missiles would pose for the United States. (401) President Kennedy issued a warning on September 4 that the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, such as surface-to-surface missiles, would raise the gravest issues for the United States. (411)

In an effort to assess Soviet intentions, Theodore Sorensen, the President's Special Counsel and close adviser, met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on September 6 for a discussion of outstanding tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dobrynin conveyed a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy assuring the President that "nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in relations between our two countries."

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Sorensen replied that the President felt that recent Soviet actions in Cuba had already caused a significant problem, and that the Chairman's message seemed, therefore, "hollow and tardy." Sorensen added that the President took the Soviet military build-up in Cuba as a "deliberate and personal affront" and "could hardly be expected to take a very accommodating attitude in the months ahead." (415)

On September 11, the Soviet Union warned that any attack by the United States on Cuba or upon Soviet ships bound for Cuba would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. (422) Meanwhile, those tasked with responsibility for Operation Mongoose worked on such assigned tasks as developing post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. (424, 425) At a press conference on September 13, President Kennedy dismissed speculation concerning the possibility of an imminent invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. Military action by the United States against Cuba would be triggered, Kennedy stated, only if Cuba posed a threat to any other nation in the hemisphere, or if Cuba became an offensive military base for the Soviet Union. (429) On September 19, the intelligence community produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate on "The Military Buildup in Cuba." (433) The estimate concluded that the Soviet military buildup was essentially defensive in nature, designed to protect Cuba against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceived to be the danger that the United States might attempt to overthrow the Castro government. It was considered unlikely that the Soviet Union would run the risk of attempting to establish a base for offensive weapons, such as medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. CIA Director McCone, who was in France on a honeymoon holiday, questioned that conclusion, and reiterated his concern that the Soviet Union was introducing ballistic missiles into Cuba. (420) On September 21, President Kennedy instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to ensure that military contingency plans with regard to Cuba were kept up-to-date, taking into account the additions to Cuban armaments resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians. (434)

That same afternoon, Admiral Anderson, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, issued a directive to his command to be prepared to conduct an air and naval blockade of Cuba on command from "higher authority." (435) Also on September 21, the first credible report of the arrival of what appeared to be Soviet

medium-range ballistic missiles was received in Washington. Intelligence analysts checked this report against available photography and other reports and, by September 28, developed the hypothesis that MRBM sites were under preparation in Pinar del Rio province. The Joint Staff made arrangements to brief the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this dangerous development on Monday, October 1. (436) By the end of September 1962, therefore, it was clear that Cuba was on the verge of becoming a more difficult and dangerous problem for the Kennedy administration. It remained to be determined whether the President would respond to that emerging threat by authorizing the use of US military force to move the plans to contain, destabilize, and overthrow the Castro government beyond those envisioned and authorized under Phase II of Operation Mongoose.

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Summary of Print Volume XI

Following is a summary of the contents of print volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. Parenthetical citations are to the numbered documents in the text. Volume XI, published in 1997, is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Discovery of the Missiles

Before October 1, 1962, U.S. intelligence suspected a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, but it did not know definitively whether these arms included strategic weapons capable of threatening the United States. On October 5, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone predicted that the Soviet military buildup in Cuba "would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles]." McCone stated this was more a "probability" than a "possibility." Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy disagreed, doubting that the Soviet Union would mount such a brazen challenge. (9) President Kennedy approved a U-2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba to obtain evidence about the development of MRBM sites on the island. The flight, which took place on October 14, provided the first proof of the existence of Soviet MRBM missiles in Cuba. (16) At 8:45 a.m. on October 16, McGeorge Bundy informed Kennedy of the photographs of the missile sites, and the President immediately called a meeting of his principal advisers for 11:45 that morning. At this meeting the administration began its response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the cold war.

Initial Deliberations

During that morning meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested that there were two alternatives: a quick unilateral military strike at the missile sites or alerting U.S. allies and the Soviet Union to the fact that the placement of the missiles could lead to war. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave a preliminary estimate of the military options. At the conclusion of the meeting the President asked his advisers to meet with him again that evening, stressing that the missiles had to be taken out. Other related issues for decision were whether to strike tar-

gets other than the missile sites and whether to invade the island. (18)

At the evening meeting, Rusk, McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Maxwell Taylor raised doubts about the efficacy of strictly military actions, pointing to the political fallout in Latin America and noting that air strikes were unlikely to be completely effective. Despite these reservations, the discussion of the U.S. response still focused on a military riposte. (21) Kennedy's advisers met again on the morning and afternoon of October 17 and raised the possibility of warning both Castro and Khrushchev to remove the missiles. If the response was negative, then the United States would use the military air strike option. McNamara and Taylor both counseled against this idea since it would give time for the missiles to become operational. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson seconded this view. By the evening of October 17, the military option still held sway, although Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen argued strongly for a diplomatic approach, while Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin supported the idea of a blockade coupled with a declaration of war. (23)

By the morning of October 18, Kennedy and his advisers began to explore the idea of blockading Cuba because of the expected negative reaction by U.S. allies to a military solution. Still, the President remained noncommittal about the blockade. He constantly queried his advisers about allied reactions to air strikes. (28) Also on October 18, the Central Intelligence Agency reported sensitive intelligence, based on U-2 flights and its best Soviet source, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, that mobile medium-range ballistic missiles were already operational and fixed intermediate-range missiles near Havana would be operational by December. (30)

U.S. policy remained far from finalized when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called at the White House at 5 p.m. on October 18. Gromyko defended the Soviet Union's supplying arms to Cuba without mentioning the missiles and accused the United States of planning to invade the island. Kennedy responded that the arms supply had had a serious negative impact in the United States. The President pointedly told Gromyko that the United States was basing its policy on the Soviet assertion that the arms supplied to Castro were defensive (Kennedy did not inform Gromyko that he knew about the offensive weapons).

Following the meeting, the President's advisers met at the State Department and following that with the President at the White House to discuss options. Although they reached no decision, they were becoming increasingly interested in the blockade as the preferred option. (29)

Meetings on October 19 began at 11 a.m. and lasted until 7 p.m. Discussion centered on the legal aspects of a blockade, which most participants now agreed was a promising option, although for international legal reasons it was to be called a quarantine. Discussion of a military strike continued, however, with Taylor commenting that a blockade meant the abandonment of an air strike. Early in the afternoon, the participants formed two working groups to present alternatives to the President: a blockade scenario and a paper on the military option. Drafts of these reports were discussed at 4 p.m. meetings. McNamara now pointed out that the United States would probably have to give up its missile bases in Italy and Turkey in return for a negotiated removal of the Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. (31) When the meetings ended the two alternatives were still open.

The two options were submitted to the President at the 2:30 p.m. meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on October 20. McNamara pushed for the blockade, advising the President that to succeed they probably would have to accept withdrawal of U.S. missiles in southern Europe. The pros and cons of the blockade were discussed for 2 hours as were those of the air strike scenario, which at this point was still supported by Bundy, Taylor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Attorney General noted that a blockade coupled with an air strike was very attractive to him. McCone opposed the air strikes, but admitted that a blockade did not seem to be a sufficient response. The President expressed his concern that whichever option was chosen, the Soviet Union would respond with a blockade of Berlin. After further discussion, Kennedy was prepared to go with the blockade, but wanted preparations for an air strike completed for either October 21 or 22 just in case. At the close of the NSC meeting, the participants considered how the blockade plan could be incorporated into the President's address to the nation. (34)

On October 21, the NSC thoroughly vetted the President's speech, reviewed military contingency plans, and discussed diplomatic measures. The President rejected UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's suggestions for a proposed summit meeting and a

neutralization of Cuba or return of Guantanamo as means of easing the Soviet decision to dismantle the missiles. (38)

The Quarantine

At 6 p.m. on October 22, U.S. representatives in Washington and Moscow delivered a letter from the President to Khrushchev stating that the Kennedy administration knew about the missiles and other offensive weapons introduced into Cuba by the Soviet Union and stating that the United States was determined to remove this threat to hemispheric security. (44) Attached to the letter was a copy of the President's address to the nation, given 1 hour later, announcing the quarantine of Cuba and calling on the Soviet Union "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace."

On the evening of October 23, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to open up an informal channel to the Russians. Although the Attorney General told the Soviet Ambassador that he was not operating on instructions from the President, Dobrynin could have only believed that the Attorney General spoke with the approval of his brother. Robert Kennedy emphasized the administration's sense of betrayal at Soviet duplicity. (53) The next day, Khrushchev responded by accusing the United States of violating the UN Charter and all the norms of freedom of the seas. He reiterated the standard Soviet line that all the weapons being supplied to Cuba were defensive. (48) Ignoring this self-serving explanation, President Kennedy asked Khrushchev to instruct Soviet vessels headed to Havana to observe the terms of the quarantine, which would go into effect at 9 a.m. on October 24. (52) Khrushchev refused to comply, stating on October 24 that he considered the blockade "an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear war." (61) As Soviet ships approached the quarantine line, the Kennedy administration had some sobering moments, but by the afternoon of October 24, the Soviet ships began to turn back. (58)

In a long letter of October 26, Khrushchev repeated that the missiles were strictly defensive and accused the United States of "proclaiming piratical measures" in establishing the blockade. Khrushchev suggested that if Washington would promise not to invade Cuba and remove the blockade, the Soviet Union would declare that its ships bound for the island were not carrying arms. (84) The letter bore Khrushchev's personal style and the

Kennedy administration was encouraged. In addition, there were hints from a Soviet intelligence official, Alexandr Fomin, to John Scali of ABC news that the Soviet Union would accept a public pledge not to invade in return for dismantling the missiles. (80, 85)

The Crisis Averted

On October 27, Khrushchev agreed to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba but only in return for the United States removing its MRBMs from Turkey. The letter from Khrushchev, which the Kennedy administration deemed to have been drafted by committee, also insisted upon mutual pledges by the United States and the Soviet Union to respect the inviolability of Cuban and Turkish borders. (91) Initial discussion by the Executive Committee suggested that the proposed trade was unacceptable. (92, 94) How far was the Kennedy administration prepared to go to remove the missiles from Cuba? There had been preliminary discussion about a possible trade of Italian and Turkish missiles. (56) Recent statements by former Soviet participants in the crisis suggest that Robert Kennedy planted the idea of a missile trade in Dobrynin's mind at a meeting on the evening of October 26, but no first-hand record of this meeting has been found. Significantly, while most of the President's advisers opposed a missile trade at an Executive Committee meeting on October 27, the President suggested that a trade, especially if the Turks took the initiative, would be better than an attack on Cuba. (90)

At the suggestion of Llewellyn Thompson, Ted Sorensen, and Robert Kennedy, the President deliberately ignored Khrushchev's letter of October 27 on the Turkish MRBMs altogether and responded to the letter of October 26. Kennedy responded on October 27 that the first issue to be dealt with was the removal of Soviet missiles and offensive weapons systems from Cuba. If this was done and properly verified, he promised to lift the quarantine and pledged not to invade Cuba. (95) To make matters worse, a U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba and its pilot was killed. On the evening of October 27, Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin that time was running out. If the Soviet Union did not remove the missiles, the United States would do it. Robert Kennedy stated there "would be dead Americans but their also would be dead Russians." Dobrynin asked what Kennedy was offering. The Attorney Gen-

eral mentioned the non-invasion pledge. When Dobrynin asked about the Turkish missiles, Robert Kennedy said there could be no quid pro quo—no deal—since it was a NATO question and NATO would not act under threat. The Attorney General added, at the President's instruction, that the missiles would be removed within 4 or 5 months. In his report to Rusk, Robert Kennedy crossed out this passage, (96) but as he confirmed later in *Thirteen Days*, he did make the statement to Dobrynin. Rusk has subsequently suggested that, in the last resort, the Kennedy administration was prepared to trade missiles. In his memoir, *As I Saw It*, Rusk recalled that Kennedy approved a plan to have the UN arrange the missile trade, if necessary. (99)

However, these plans were not required. On October 28, Khrushchev replied positively to the President's letter of October 27, saying that instructions had been given to Soviet officials in Cuba to dismantle and crate up for return to the Soviet Union the "arms which you described as offensive." (102) Khrushchev also informed Kennedy that First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov would go to New York to negotiate a solution "aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation." Kuznetsov arrived the following day and began negotiations with Stevenson, John J. McCloy, and Secretary General U Thant, to establish procedures to verify the removal of the missiles and to end the blockade. (112) There was a storm cloud, however: Fidel Castro insisted that he would never accept United Nations verification on Cuban soil. (123)

Verification of Removal of the Missiles

The Khrushchev letter of October 28 lightened the tension in Washington immensely, but there were still serious problems. Kennedy insisted on continuing low-level air reconnaissance over Cuba until the Soviet Union made good on its promise to allow UN verification. (130, 131) The President was adamant that the withdrawal of the missiles must be verified, a suspected Soviet submarine base eliminated, and Cuba "demilitarized." (138, 139)

Fomin asked Scali for patience and understanding from Kennedy. (137) Perhaps the missiles could be inspected at sea. McCloy and Stevenson received this same message from their Soviet counterparts at the United Nations. Stevenson informed Kennedy on November 3 that although the Russians might agree to ground inspection, the Cubans would not. Kennedy

then insisted that Soviet IL-28 bombers in Cuba must also go. (138)

McCloy met Kuznetsov in Stamford, Connecticut, on November 4. The Soviet negotiator rejected the bombers as offensive weapons. He offered verification of all 42 Soviet missiles at sea but insisted upon a guarantee against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and a prohibition of U.S.-backed subversion against Castro in return. As for the submarine base, Kuznetsov stated it was only a fishing port. (142) In their correspondence on November 3 and 5, Kennedy and Khrushchev jostled over verification. Khrushchev argued that the bombers were not offensive, and furthermore they constituted a new demand. He challenged the President to get on with the deal. (140, 145)

Kennedy began to realize that ironclad verification in Cuba was impossible. John McCone sensed that the tide was running against full verification and submitted a strong dissent. He predicted that Castro would survive, and with bombers and Komars (Soviet missile boats), could threaten the rest of Latin America. To make matters worse according to McCone, the Soviet SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) in Cuba with their ability to shoot down U-2s could provide blanket cover for the reintroduction of offensive missiles. (146)

The dangers of verification became obvious on November 5 when during a meeting with Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy was interrupted by a call from his brother, the President, informing him that a U.S. plane flying reconnaissance over Cuba had been fired upon. Robert Kennedy stressed to Dobrynin that any "arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba." (144)

In New York on November 6, Stevenson and McCloy learned that Soviet ships would be taking the missiles out of Cuba starting on November 6 and 7. Asked if they would also remove nuclear weapons as well, Kuznetsov replied that if there were nuclear weapons in Cuba they would be removed with the missiles. (151)

With Soviet ships departing with the missiles that day, the Kennedy administration had to work out an ad hoc means of verification. U.S. officials concluded that the best method was for U.S. Naval ships to pull along side departing Soviet ships to verify and take photographs. (152, 153) At the Executive Committee meeting on the evening of November 6, the participants dissuaded the President from taking too hard a line with

Khrushchev. Instead they persuaded Kennedy to concentrate on the issue at hand, verification of the missiles' removal, saving the bomber issue for later negotiations. (154) Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev of November 6 nonetheless contained a strong objection to Khrushchev's view that the bombers were not offensive weapons and therefore not subject to the understanding of October 27-28. (155)

At the next Executive Committee meeting, it was clear that the President had been won over. He agreed to delay action on the bombers until the missiles were out. (158) At the United Nations, Stevenson and McCloy received instructions outlining the minimum deal the United States would accept: MRBM, IRBMs, bombers, and nuclear weapons must leave. The United States was prepared to accept Soviet assurances that there would be no submarine base in Cuba. (159)

On November 8, Kuznetsov informed Stevenson and McCloy that the 42 missiles were out of Cuba completing the Soviet part of the understanding. The warheads would also go and the Soviets now expected the United States to fulfill its part of the bargain. (163) The next day Stevenson suggested to Washington a plan for settling outstanding issues, which included calling off the quarantine, a formal U.S. pledge in the UN Security Council against invasion of Cuba in return for Soviet removal of the bombers with verification at sea, and a formal Soviet assurance to the Security Council that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba. Soviet compliance would be verified by Latin American diplomats in Cuba. The Soviet Union and Cuba would also agree not to reintroduce offensive weapons, and the United States would agree to call off subversion and sabotage against Cuba. Under Secretary of State George Ball did not like Stevenson's plan, which he characterized as a "guarantee" for Castro with "no obligations," but he passed it to the President without written comment. (167, 168)

The Bomber Crisis and the Non-Invasion Pledge

Ball had his own plan for resolving the bomber crisis, which he recommended to the President. Earlier Ball had agreed with McGeorge Bundy that the bombers should be downgraded to a U.S.-Cuban problem, not a U.S.-Soviet issue. (164) Ball now suggested that the United States accept the Soviet Union's contention that it could not control Castro and thus eliminate the issue of the IL-28s from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. dialogue. (169) Ball's

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idea seemed the right course when Khrushchev gave his "gentleman's word" in a letter of November 12 to Kennedy that the bombers would be removed, "not now but later." Khrushchev could not resist, however, pointing out that without air cover the bombers could be shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, regular artillery, or fighters. How could the President consider these defenseless planes as a threat? (171)

The Kennedy administration deliberated whether to accept Khrushchev's "gentlemen's agreement." The President leaned that way. Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin that if the Soviet Union gave the order to remove the bombers and they were out within 30 days, the United States would immediately lift the quarantine. (172, 173) McCone objected and warned that even stripped of missiles and bombers Castro remained a serious threat. (174) Any chance that the issue would be resolved immediately was eliminated by Khrushchev's letter of November 14 insisting that 30 days was not enough time for withdrawal of the IL-28s. Khrushchev suggested that if the United States stopped overflights of Cuba—something Kennedy was unprepared to do—he would announce the withdrawal of the bombers. (176) In a November 15 letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy admitted that the bombers deal was only a matter of timing, but the issue of verification remained unresolved, especially in light of unconfirmed reports of weapons stored in caves. Kennedy demanded safeguards against the reintroduction of strategic weapons and worried that "trouble" might spring from Cuban sources. (181)

At the Executive Committee meeting on November 16, Kennedy vowed that the United States would continue to overfly Cuba in the face of Cuban threats to shoot down reconnaissance planes. The President accepted in principle McCone's warning that SAMs must not be allowed to shield a new Soviet military build up. McCloy then presented Stevenson's assessment that the U.S.-Soviet negotiations at the United Nations were deadlocked. The Soviets could not deliver on-site inspections because of Castro's insistence on receiving in return a non-invasion pledge. The President suggested that perhaps the deadlock could be resolved informally with a public statement promising no invasion of Cuba—provided there was no military threat or civil war—while the United States continued unobtrusive overflights. Kennedy envisioned a solution without a clear, formal agreement. (185)

U.S. and Soviet negotiators met on the evening of November 19 at the Soviet compound in Locust Valley on Long Island for a discussion marked by recriminations and reproaches. McCloy stated that the President must say something about the bombers in his press conference of November 20. If there was no agreement on them, then there was no agreement on offensive weapons. The United States would not sign a non-invasion pledge—that would make it a treaty requiring Senate confirmation—but it would make a “solemn declaration” in the United Nations. Kuznetsov replied that the Soviet Union would remove the bombers, but only in conjunction with settlement of other issues including overflights. McCloy shot back that there was no stopping overflights until there was adequate verification. Furthermore, if U.S. reconnaissance planes were attacked, they would return fire. (191) At the Executive Committee meeting the morning of November 19, the same showdown state of mind prevailed. After the meeting, Ball informed McCloy that his Soviet counterparts should be informed that if there were no deal on the IL-28s the Soviet Union could expect a more drastic and extended quarantine. (192, 193)

Under this pressure the Soviet Union retreated. Fomin assured Scali that the procedure for verification of missiles could be used for bombers and that Soviet IL-28 technicians were returning to the Soviet Union. If the United States lifted the blockade and gave the Soviets a draft of a non-aggression pledge, the two-sides had a deal. (195) Fomin's promises were followed by a November 20 letter from Khrushchev who agreed to remove the bombers with their technicians within a month or sooner. (196) The United States then lifted the quarantine and the crisis that began on October 16, 1962, was finally over. There was general agreement on November 20 that since Khrushchev had not insisted on a formal non-invasion pledge, he should not be given one. (197) McCloy called Ball to register his belief that since the Soviet Union had come through for the United States, they should get a non-invasion declaration. (199) Ball discussed it with McGeorge Bundy who stated that 42 missiles and 30 bombers did not constitute much of a concession. When the United States got real verification, Cuba would get a non-invasion pledge. (200)

At the Executive Committee meeting on November 21, Kennedy agreed to abandon U.S. demands for ground inspection in Cuba, but he would not relinquish the right to invade Cuba in

the event of civil war, in response to Cuban fostered guerrilla subversion directed against Latin American, or if offensive weapons were reintroduced into Cuba. Kennedy was not prepared to "build up Castro with a no invasion pledge." (201) Instead the President informed Khrushchev that he need have "no fear of invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course." (202) Kennedy then drafted language with Ball for a very cautious and qualified pledge not to invade Cuba. (204)

The "Understanding" on Cuba

At this point the Kennedy administration faced a cross-roads. Either it could extend negotiations with the Soviet Union on UN verification and the non-invasion pledge or it could move to rapidly conclude the matter. (205) Former President Eisenhower and McCloy favored a quick wrap up on Cuba, relying on overflights and other intelligence resources to verify. Neither one held out much hope for the effectiveness of UN inspection of Cuba. McCone remained opposed to any non-invasion pledge. (209)

The administration initially tried negotiations. McCloy and Stevenson met with Mikoyan, the "hardest bargainer in [the] Kremlin's stable of tough negotiators." Mikoyan made the case for Castro's role in the negotiations, insisted on reciprocity of inspections, and objected that the draft U.S. non-invasion pledge was only an intention, not a commitment. Clearly, Mikoyan was not considering a quick resolution. (213)

The President was unprepared to make concessions that would pave the way for a formal settlement. As he told the Executive Committee on November 29, he would rather have Soviet troops in Cuba than give Castro a non-invasion pledge. At this same meeting, the President authorized the continuation of Mongoose Operations (a special program of intelligence operations directed at Cuba), but restricted it to intelligence gathering. (216, 217) In his meeting with Mikoyan, who had just returned from a long and unpleasant visit to Cuba, Kennedy gave no ground. (218, 219)

At the Executive Committee meeting on December 3, Stevenson and Ball explained the three issues holding up negotiations in New York: the manner in which the United States expressed its intention to continue overflights, U.S. insistence on preservation of peace in the Caribbean, and the no-invasion undertaking. As the President put it, he was "not going to rat on

an agreement with the Russians, but we are not going to tie on to a no-invasion pledge in a way which allowed Castro to operate from an invulnerable base." (222)

McCloy and Stevenson argued for concessions to allow them to conclude the negotiations. (227, 228) McCone spoke against such a course. (224, 229) It was generally agreed within the administration that the United States should not accept just any agreement, but should hold out for a good one. (230) The chances for a formal resolution dimmed. Nevertheless, the President authorized Stevenson and McCloy to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of a joint report to the Security Council, but on terms that the Soviet Union was not likely to accept. (243) The Soviet negotiators rejected this last U.S. offer on December 14, stating that the non-invasion pledge was too qualified, that reference to overflights was included, and that there was no provision for Cuban participation. The Soviets countered with a plan to send the Kennedy and Khrushchev letters of October 27 and 28 to the Security Council. (253, 256) The Kennedy administration responded with a plan to send the letters plus the White House and Presidential press statements of October 27 and November 20. If the Soviets rejected this, then either a joint or separate letters to the Secretary General should be sent saying that despite progress made, the United States and Soviet Union could not resolve their differences. (257) There was no resolution. The United States and the Soviet Union decided on a joint letter to the Secretary General admitting their inability to agree. (259, 263) The long and drawn out negotiations for a mutually acceptable agreed resolution to the Cuban missile crisis ended in failure. There was no specific set of obligations and procedures, just Soviet removal of the missiles and the bombers and a promise of a gradual scaling down of Soviet military personnel in Cuba in return for a lifting of the quarantine, the indication that U.S. missiles would eventually be removed from Turkey, and limited assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. In the end, there were no formal U.S.-Soviet understandings to end the Cuban missile crisis.

Covert Operations Against Cuba

The remainder of the volume covers 1963 in which U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Cuba is only one of a number of themes. Other major issues include increased covert operations against Cuba including more extensive and efficient use of refugees and

exiles, tighter economic pressure against Cuba, and exploration of a possible rapprochement with Castro. The Kennedy administration used the natural breaking point of the end of the missile and bomber crises to reorganize its covert operations against Castro by disbanding Operation Mongoose and placing day-to-day responsibility for covert and overt operations under a Department of State Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. (261)

The Kennedy administration began 1963 with an internal debate over covert operations against Cuba. Should it try to isolate and then actively seek the overthrow of Castro or should it isolate Cuba and seek reduction of Soviet presence as a more limited goal? Debate also ranged over tactics. Should the United States apply increasing degrees of pressure or merely press Castro as opportunities presented themselves? (270, 272) In mid-April, the Cuban Coordinator, Sterling Cottrell, recommended a more intensified covert program against Cuba without resolving the broader questions. (318) McGeorge Bundy suggested that the United States faced three options: confrontation with Castro to force a non-Communist solution, gradual pressure to achieve limited ends, or accommodation. (320) The overriding problem, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, was that Castro was gaining strength within Cuba. As McCone saw it, present covert operations could slow Castro down, but would not hurt him critically. (323) On May 28, the issue came to a head at a meeting of the Standing Group of the NSC. McGeorge Bundy stated that the United States did not have the ability to overthrow Castro. McCone countered that increasing economic hardship on Cuba would cause the Cuban military to overthrow him. McNamara wondered just which economic denial and covert policies would accomplish Castro's demise. Robert Kennedy suggested that the United States had to do something, even if it did not believe that it would cause Castro's fall. (344) On June 8, the Central Intelligence Agency submitted an intensified covert plan that assumed that the United States would not invade Cuba, but which was designed to apply maximum pressure to prevent Castro from consolidating his rule and to encourage dissident Cuban elements to eliminate his control and reduce Soviet influence. The President approved, but he had no illusions that Castro would soon be out of power. (346, 348)

Possible Rapprochement With Cuba

As the Kennedy administration was increasing covert operations against Castro, it was also considering the possibility of a rapprochement with him. McGeorge Bundy had tentatively raised the issue in early 1963. (261) McCone also suggested to the President in mid-April 1963 that better contacts with Castro could possibly turn him away from the Soviets. (315) Later in April 1963, Bundy raised the issue again and suggested that although it seemed contradictory, accommodation still was compatible with more anti-Castro options. (320) It was Kennedy's two-track play.

One of the problems with the policy of accommodation was how to contact Castro. Lawyer James B. Donovan, who was negotiating the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, was one channel, (310, 330) 238); journalists were another (332). Obviously the policy was extremely controversial and held very closely. Although he earlier raised it as a possibility, McCone came to believe it was a "bad idea" and "dangerous politically." McCone worried that Rusk favored it. (351) McGeorge Bundy agreed that the time was not yet right for détente with Castro, but he saw no harm in keeping channels open. (356)

The most definite attempt to contact Castro came at the initiative of former Ambassador to Guinea, William Attwood, who used his personal contacts with Cuban UN representative Carlos Lechuga to raise the issue. (367, 372, 374) On November 12, 1963, President Kennedy authorized Attwood's tentative talks with Dr. René Vallejo, Castro's aide and physician, but the two men did not get together. (377) Kennedy's assassination delayed the process. White House officials suggested that the Attwood channel was now less promising since Lyndon Johnson probably ran a greater risk of appearing "soft" on Castro if the talks become known publicly. (378) Nevertheless, Castro was still interested and White House officials favored continuing the dialogue. (383, 384) When President Johnson learned of these talks in mid-December, apparently for the first time, he was "somewhere between lukewarm and cool" on the idea. (387, 388) The initiative lost momentum.

Soviet Troops in Cuba and Cuban Exiles

The major cause of U.S.-Soviet friction over Cuba in 1963 was U.S. concern with reducing the thousands of Soviet military

personnel in Cuba. In January 1963, Kuznetsov promised Kennedy that they would be withdrawn in time. (266) In late February, Dobrynin told Thompson that "several thousand" troops would be withdrawn later in the month. (286, 287) McCone held that the Soviets were in Cuba to stay no matter how many incremental withdrawals they made. (299, 314) By mid-1963, the CIA reported that 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops were still in Cuba. Although there was no indication of reintroduction of Soviet strategic weapons, Castro was gaining political strength. (347) By October 1963, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that 5,000 to 8,000 Soviet military troops were in Cuba. (370) Gromyko assured a skeptical Kennedy that only specialists remained. (371) McCone assured the President in mid-November that the Soviets were gradually withdrawing but leaving their equipment for the Cubans. (375)

The use of Cuban exiles and refugees against Castro is the last principal theme of 1963. Rusk opposed the hit-and-run tactics of U.S.-sponsored exile groups as an unnecessary and complicating factor in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. Rusk wanted to control exile groups more effectively. Over McCone's opposition, he convinced the President to do so. (302, 303, 304) The United States discouraged exile raids from U.S. territory, but was less able to control raids from outside the United States. (365, 366)

When he became President, Johnson did not reexamine U.S. policy toward Cuba. He remained committed to Kennedy's concept of non-invasion as long as certain conditions were met. If anything, Johnson wanted a more effective covert and economic denial program against Cuba. (381, 388-390) Although U.S.-Cuban relations would prove difficult and antagonistic during Johnson's years, they never reached the drama and tension of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

List of Documents

No.	Document Description
Bolivia	
1	Telegram 430 from La Paz, February 9, 1961. Transmits text of Bolivian communiqué on U.S.-Bolivian agreement on U.S. military assistance for Bolivian economic development and internal security. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.247/2-961.
2	Memorandum from Schlesinger to Kennedy, March 3, 1961. The crisis in Bolivia. No classification marking. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Latin America.
3	Memorandum from General Lemnitzer to McNamara, JCSM-236-61, April 13, 1961. Bolivian request for a bilateral agreement. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Bolivia, 1961, 000.1—.
4	Memorandum from Hilsman (INR) to Woodward (ARA), July 18, 1961. Latin American and U.S. concern for Bolivian stability and security. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/7-2461.
5	Memorandum of conversation, July 21, 1961, between Rusk and Bolivian Ambassador Andrade. Bolivian Government request for \$11 million emergency economic assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
6	Memorandum of conversation, October 18, 1961, among Rusk, Andrade, and Fitzgerald (ICA). Bolivian request for emergency assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
7	Memorandum from Hamilton (ICA) to Dungan, June 28, 1962. Transmits for Kennedy's approval a joint U.S.-IADB program of development assistance for Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Box 32.

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No.	Document Description
8	Memorandum from Dungan to President Kennedy, July 6, 1962. Transmits a memorandum to approve announcement of the U.S. commitment of assistance to Bolivia; handwritten note that Kennedy approved. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Bolivia, 1961-1962.
9	Memorandum from Hansen (BOB) to Dungan, July 19, 1962. Concerns about the Bolivian aid commitment. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Bolivia, 1961-1962.
10	Memorandum from Topping (S/P) to Rostow, July 30, 1962. Observations concerning the Alliance for Progress and Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Bolivia.
11	Memorandum of conversation, November 15, 1962, between Rusk and Andrade. Exchange of views during Andrade's farewell call. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/11-1562.
12	Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1963, between Kennedy and Ambassador Sanchez de Lozada. Exchange of views during presentation of credentials. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.
13	Memorandum from Major General Lansdale to McNamara and Gilpatric, June 3, 1963. Report on visit to Bolivia. Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.
14	Memorandum from Read (S/S) to McGeorge Bundy, July 20, 1963. Transmits memorandum on the situation in Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.
15	Memorandum from Cottrell (ARA) to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), July 31, 1963. The internal security threat in Bolivia and contingency planning. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4-7/63.

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No.	Document Description
16	Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. General exchange of views. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
17	Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Bolivian-Chilean relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
18	Memorandum of conversation, October 22, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Alliance for Progress; U.S. aid to Bolivia; development assistance; petroleum. Confidential. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, Paz Visit, 10/63.
19	Memorandum of conversation, October 23, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Cuban subversion. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
20	Memorandum of conversation, October 23, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Communist propaganda. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
21	Memorandum of conversation, October 23, 1963, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials. Alliance for Progress; U.S. assistance. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
22	Memorandum of conversation, November 20, 1963, between Kennedy and Ambassador Henderson. Discussion of Henderson's mission to Bolivia. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General, 8/63-1/64.

Chile

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| 23 | Memorandum of conversation, February 20, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Mueller. Financial assistance to Chile. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.5-MSP/2-2061. |
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No.	Document Description
24	Memorandum from Achilles to Berle, April 13, 1961. Chilean attitude toward Cuban problem; aid to Chile Christian Democratic Party. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Task Force on Latin America Files: Lot 61 D 298, Chile.
25	Memorandum of conversation, April 17, 1961, between Dillon and Agriculture Minister Casanueva. Chilean economic adjustment and planning for the future. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.25/4-1761.
26	Memorandum of conversation, June 2, 1961, between Barall and Chargé Soto. Difficulties in programming U.S. assistance for Chilean reconstruction. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.5-MSP/6-261.
27	Memorandum of conversation, October 10, 1961, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Martinez. Recent political changes in Chile; Alliance for Progress; economic development; land reform; Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, October-December 1961.
28	Instructions for Moscoso Mission, undated. Two-phased proposal of conditional U.S. financial assistance to Chile. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1962.
29	Telegram 746 from Santiago, March 8, 1962. Text of agreement worked out with Chilean cabinet re U.S. loans to Chile. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1962.
30	Telegram 58 to Santiago, July 20, 1962. Reiteration of U.S. hard line with respect to Chile's economic problems and programs. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, July-October, 1962.
31	Letter from Charles W. Cole to Edwin M. Martin, July 23, 1962. Crucial points in U.S.-Chile economic relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.25/7-2362.
32	Memorandum from Belcher to Edwin M. Martin, July 25, 1962. Ambassador Cole's position on the situation in Chile. Confidential. DOS, CF, 725.00/7-2562.

No.	Document Description
33	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Current situation in Chile; Alliance for Progress. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.
34	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Problems and importance of American investment in Chile. Limited Official Use. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.
35	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.
36	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. U.S. military assistance programs; Chilean relations with Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.
37	Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Press reports about Chile. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.
38	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. Chile and Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Chile, December 1963.
39	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Alessandri. Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, November-December 1962.

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No.	Document Description
40	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, between President Alessandri and President Kennedy. Communists in international organizations. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, November-December 1962.
41	Memorandum of conversation, December 12, 1962, among President Alessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials. U.S. aid; relationship of EEC with LAFTA. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January-June, 1963.
42	Memorandum of conversation, January 24, 1963, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Muller. Farewell call on the President. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 725.00/1-2463.
43	Telegram 37 to Santiago, July 24, 1963. Text not declassified. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 12 CHILE.
44	Memorandum of conversation, August 19, 1963, between President Kennedy and Senator Duran from Chile. Political situation and upcoming election in Chile. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, July-November 1963.
45	National Intelligence Estimate 94-63, October 3, 1963. "The Chilean Situation and Prospects." Secret. 25 pp. CIA, ODDI Registry, Job 79-R01012A.
46	Memorandum of conversation, November 14, 1963, among Belcher, Thompson, Richardson, Carlisle, and others. Chilean Presidential election of 1964 and implications for U.S. strategy and policy. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 14 CHILE.

Colombia

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| 47 | Memorandum of conversation, February 17, 1961, among Rusk, Ambassador Sanz de Santamaria, and U.S. and Colombian officials. Exchange of views on matters of mutual interest. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. |
| 48 | Memorandum of conversation, February 25, 1961, between Lleras Camargo and Adolf A. Berle, Jr. General exchange of views including: economic conditions; Caribbean crisis; Government of Haiti; Cuba; Mexico. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 721.11/2-2561. |

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No.	Document Description
49	Memorandum of conversation, March 23, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría. U.S. military and financial assistance to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
50	Memorandum from Mulliken to Carwell, June 8, 1961. Meeting with Colombian Ambassador on coffee price stabilization. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 611.21/6-861.
51	Telegram 3 to Bogota, July 3, 1961. Letter from Rusk to President Lleras expressing gratification for President's initiative on the Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, 1961.
52	Telegram 145 to Bogota, August 28, 1961. Instructions for meeting with President Lleras and Foreign Minister Turbay regarding action program on Cuba outlined earlier by Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/8-2861.
53	Memorandum of conversation, September 25, 1961, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Turbay. Lleras Plan to test Cuba's willingness to remain in the Inter-American system. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, 1961.
54	Memorandum from Woodward to Acting Secretary, September 27, 1961. Urgent need for internal security aid to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.5-MSP/9-2761.
55	Memorandum of conversation, October 6, 1961, between Ambassador Sanz de Santamaría and Coerr. Colombian request for additional internal security aid. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.5-MSP/10-661.
56	Telegram 234 from Bogota, October 12, 1961. State of siege declared throughout Colombia by President Lleras. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/10-1361.
57	Telegram 315 to Bogota, November 1, 1961. Announcement that President Kennedy has signed determination to furnish internal security aid to Colombia. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/11-0161.

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No.	Document Description
58	Memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Lleras. Developments in the Dominican Republic; planning for Foreign Ministers meeting on Cuban problem. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, January 1962.
59	Memorandum of conversation, June 8, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Freeman. Alliance for Progress results in Colombia. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
60	Memorandum of conversation, June 26, 1962, among U. Alexis Johnson, President-elect Valencia and other U.S. and Colombian officials. Review of relations between the two countries. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.21/6-2662.
61	Airgram A-145 from Bogota, September 5, 1962. Transmits September 4 memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Freeman and President Valencia on the violence problem in Colombia. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 721.00/9-562.
62	Memorandum of conversation, September 18, 1962, between Rusk and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaria. Farewell call of Ambassador; Colombian request for \$60 million balance-of-payments loan and counterpart release. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
63	Memorandum of conversation, September 27, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Sanz de Santamaria. Farewell call of Ambassador; Coffee Agreement; Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Colombia, July-September 1962.
64	DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Colombia, December 1962. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121.
65	Memorandum of conversation, February 1, 1963, among DOS officials. Colombian political and economic problems. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL COL.

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No.	Document Description
66	Airgram A-731 from Bogota, May 10, 1963. Political contingencies—extra-legal changes. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 23 COL.
67	Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1963, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Uribe Botero. Presentation of Ambassador's credentials; Colombian budgetary difficulties. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 17 COL-U.S.

Costa Rica

- 68 Despatch 576 from San Jose, April 6, 1961. Status of relations with current Costa Rican Government. Secret. 11 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4-661.
- 69 Memorandum of conversation, April 17, 1961, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Escalante. Costa Rican land reform program. Official Use Only. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Costa Rica, January-August 1961.
- 70 Despatch 625 from San Jose, April 25, 1961. President Echandi's current attitude toward U.S. aid. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/4-2561.
- 71 Telegram 519 from San Jose, May 18, 1961. Reasons for delay in presenting credentials by new U.S. Ambassador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/5-1861.
- 72 Despatch 360 from San Jose, January 24, 1962. President Echandi's concern over 1962 U.S. sugar allocation. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.235/1-2462.
- 73 Despatch 440 from San Jose, March 2, 1962. Costa Rica's fiscal difficulties and request for U.S. assistance, with a copy of a letter from the Central Bank to President-elect Orlich. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/3-262.
- 74 Despatch 442 from San Jose, March 5, 1962. U.S. efforts to encourage economic planning in Costa Rica. Official Use Only. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/3-562.
- 75 Memorandum from Woodward to Moscoso, March 7, 1962. Costa Rican financial difficulties. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/3-762.

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No.	Document Description
76	Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1962, between Foreign Minister-designate Oduber and Edwin M. Martin. Economic policies of incoming Orlich administration. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.13/4-2462.
77	Memorandum of conversation, April 24, 1962, between Foreign Minister-designate Oduber and Edwin M. Martin. Orlich government's attitude toward other Central American States. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 810.18/4-2762.
78	Memorandum of conversation, April 30, 1962, between Figures and Moscoso and other U.S. officials. Costa Rican financial situation and possibility of U.S. assistance to rectify it. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/4-3062.
79	Letter from Telles to Edwin M. Martin, May 31, 1962. End of year assessment: DOS failure to act on Embassy recommendations and lack of confidence Department has shown in Embassy; Orlich visit to Washington; Costa Rican fiscal and budgetary problem; U.S. policy in dealing with Figueres. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/5-3162.
80	Airgram A-191 from San Jose, June 4, 1962. Meeting between President Orlich and Minister of Economy Hess and Ambassador Telles on seriousness of Costa Rica's current financial crisis and President's hope for U.S. assistance. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/6-362.
81	Airgram A-46 from San Jose, July 23, 1962. Country Team recommendation for fiscal assistance to GOCR. Official Use Only. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 818.10/7-2362.
82	Memorandum of conversation, August 13, 1962, among Ambassador Facio, former Ambassador Esquivel and Edwin M. Martin. Serious budget deficit in Costa Rica; coffee conference in New York. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 718.00/8-662.
83	Memorandum of conversation, August 13, 1962, between Ambassador Facio and John W. Fischer. Costa Rican budgetary problem. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 818.00/8-1362.

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| 84 | Memorandum of conversation, September 13, 1962, among Edwin M. Martin, Ambassador Facio, and other Costa Rican and U.S. officials. U.S. assistance in Costa Rican budget crisis. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 811.10/9-1362. |
| 85 | Circular Airgram CA-6669, December 19, 1962. Approved Plan of Action toward Costa Rica from December 1962 to October 1963. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.18/12-1962. |
| 86 | Memorandum of conversation among President Kennedy, President Orlich, and other U.S. and Costa Rican officials. Requests for U.S. aid: Project financing, National Industrial Corporation; education, health and fiscal problems. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, President's Trip—San Jose, March 1963, Memcons. |
| 87 | Airgram A-7 from San Jose, July 6, 1963. Report of President Orlich first public criticism of U.S. for slow processing of GOCR loan applications. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15-1 COSTA RICA. |
| 88 | Memorandum of conversation, July 31, 1963, between Foreign Minister Oduber and Cottrell. Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL COSTA RICA-CUBA. |

Ecuador

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| 89 | Despatch 419 from Quito, February 2, 1961. U.S. economic assistance policy toward Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 822.10/2-661. |
| 90 | Telegram 447 to Quito and 553 to Lima, February 25, 1961. U.S. concerns over possible arms race between Ecuador and Peru. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.58/2-2161 |
| 91 | Memorandum of conversation, April 18, 1961, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Chiriboga. Review of relations and security in Latin America. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 720.5-MSP/4-186. |
| 92 | Memorandum of conversation, May 2, 1961, between Foreign Minister Chiriboga and A.A. Berle. Chiriboga's concern over pro-Communist forces in Ecuador. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/5-261. |

No.	Document Description
93	Despatch 673 from Quito, May 9, 1961. U.S. military relationship with Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.5-MSP/5-961.
94	Telegram 211 to Quito, undated. DOS response to request from Ecuadorean military officers for equipment to assist in maintaining internal security. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador.
95	Memorandum from McGhee to Woodward, November 9, 1961. Anatomy of the revolution in Ecuador. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.
96	Memorandum from Woodward to McGhee, November 17, 1961. Response to McGhee's November 9 memorandum on the anatomy of the Ecuadorean revolution. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.
97	Memorandum of conversation, November 24, 1961, between Rusk and Ambassador Plaza. Attitude and needs of the new Government of Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
98	Memorandum of conversation, November 28, 1961, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Plaza. New Government in Ecuador; U.S. aid. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
99	Memorandum from McClintock to Rostow, December 15, 1961, transmitting a memorandum from Woodward to McGhee and Ramsey, which attaches a memorandum from Woodward to McGhee. Preliminary analysis of recent Ecuadorean revolution. Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Ecuador.
100	Memorandum of conversation, January 10, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Ponce. Presentation of credentials; discussion of upcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, January 1961-March 1962.

No.	Document Description
101	Memorandum for the record, February 6, 1962. Text not declassified. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings With the President, Box 6, 12/1/61-6/30/62.
102	Memorandum of conversation, July 23, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena and other U.S. and Ecuadorean officials. U.S. assistance to Ecuador; situation in Ecuador; situation in Peru. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April-August, 1962.
103	Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena. Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April-August, 1962.
104	Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1962, between President Arosemena and Acting Secretary Ball and U.S. and Ecuadorean officials. Financial and economic situation in Ecuador. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Ecuador, April-August, 1962.
105	Memorandum of conversation, July 25, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Arosemena and U.S. and Ecuadorean officials. Economic problems and reform in Ecuador. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
106	Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, January 24, 1963. Transmits a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/1-2463.
107	Telegram 17 from Quito, July 11, 1963. Announcement of five-man military junta ouster of Arosemena government. Confidential. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.
108	Memorandum of conversation, July 17, 1963, between Rusk and Ambassador Ponce. Informal discussion of new regime and future of Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November 1963.

No.	Document Description
109	Circular telegram CA-73 to certain American Republic posts, July 18, 1963. U.S. withholding recognition new Government in Ecuador until junta indicates intention to return to civilian government and several other Latin American countries have recognized Ecuador. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November 1963.
110	Circular telegram 170 to certain American Republic posts, July 26, 1963. U.S. plan to recognize Ecuadorean junta by July 31 if several other Hemisphere countries do so by then. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.
111	Memorandum of conversation, August 7, 1963, between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Ponce. Farewell call of departing Ecuadorean Ambassador (the new Foreign Minister); Alliance for Progress; subversion of Communist activities in Ecuador. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Ecuador, July to November, 1963.

El Salvador

112	Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, January 25, 1961. Overthrow of the Junta Government in El Salvador by the Salvadoran Army. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.00/1-2561.
113	Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, February 9, 1961. Recommendation to recognize new Government in El Salvador on February 15. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.02/2-961.
114	Memorandum from Mann to Rusk, February 11, 1961, transmitting a memorandum from Rusk to the President. Recommendation that no formal statement be made by the President or the Department at time of recognition of Salvadoran Government. Confidential. 1 pp. DOS, CF, 716.02/2-1161.
115	Telegram 321 to San Salvador, February 13, 1961. Transmit text of note of recognition of Salvadoran Government. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 716.02/2-1361.

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| 116 | Telegram 651 from San Salvador, April 13, 1961. Need for direct financial support and moral encouragement for new regime. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 816.10/4-1361. |
| 117 | Telegram 391 to San Salvador, April 15, 1961. DOS authorization to commend Directorate's determination to improve standard of living, promote social reform, and develop economy. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 816.10/4-1361. |
| 118 | Memorandum of conversation June 9, 1961, between Ambassador Lima and Ball. Salvadoran political situation and need for U.S. financial assistance. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 716.00/6-961. |
| 119 | Telegram 502 from San Salvador, April 29, 1962. Report on elections. Official Use Only. 1 p. DOS, CF, 716.00/4-2962. |
| 120 | Memorandum from Moscoso to President Kennedy. Alliance for Progress in El Salvador. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Salvador, 1961-64. |
| 121 | Airgram CA-6720 from San Salvador, December 20, 1962. Plan of Action for El Salvador to July 1, 1963. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 611.16/12-2062. |
| 122 | Memorandum of conversation, March 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Rivera. Salvadoran political and economic situation and plans; support for Alliance informational activities; U.S. cotton policies; loan projects; Peace Corps; communism in El Salvador; travelers to Cuba. Confidential. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL EL SAL. |
| 123 | Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 22, 1963. El Salvador—long- and short-term prospects for political stability. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Salvador, 1961-64. |

Guatemala

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| 124 | Telegram 459 from Guatemala City, April 20, 1961. Report on exchange of views of current situation at a meeting with leading members of the American Community. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-2061. |
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No.	Document Description
125	Despatch 494 from Guatemala City, March 31, 1962. U.S. interests and the Guatemalan political scene following recent demonstrations. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/3-3062.
126	Telegram 496 from Guatemala City, April 19, 1962. Danger of a Communist takeover in Guatemala discussed with President Ydigoras. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-1862.
127	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to McGhee, April 26, 1962. Reasons to keep the President from getting involved in Guatemalan situation for the time being. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-2662.
128	Memorandum from Katherine W. Bracken to Edwin M. Martin, April 26, 1962. Current situation and possible contingencies in Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4-2662.
129	Airgram A-142 from Guatemala City, September 11, 1962. Transmits guidelines for policy and operations in Guatemala. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, CF, 611.14/9-1162.
130	Memorandum of conversation, November 28, 1962, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Alejos. Unrest in Guatemala and concern over Castro threat. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guatemala, September-December 1962.
131	Telegram 385 from Guatemala City, December 18, 1962. Review of attempted "Air Force" revolt and MAP deliveries. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 714.5622/12-1762.
132	Memorandum from Dungan to President Kennedy, January 22, 1963. Transmits attached background paper on Guatemala. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Guatemala, Security, 1961-63.
133	Memorandum for the record, January 22, 1963. Meeting at the White House to discuss the situation in Guatemala and Arévalo's candidacy. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/1-2263.
134	DOS Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala, February 1953. Secret. 23 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 396.

No.	Document Description
135	Memorandum of conversation, March 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Ydigoras. Relations with Cuba; elections; Belize; domestic reforms. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15-1 US/KENNEDY.
136	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to U. Alexis Johnson, March 27, 1963. Background information on March 25 siege imposed by President Ydigoras. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL GUAT.
137	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 24, 1963. Transmits memorandum summarizing the first 3 weeks of the Peralta regime in Guatemala. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 2 GUAT.
138	Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, July 31, 1963. Guatemalan request for U.S. mediation in British Honduras (Belize) dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Guatemala, April-July 1963.
139	Telegram 123 to Guatemala City, September 24, 1963. Concern over failure of Peralta regime to begin to solve the main economic and political problems facing Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL GUAT-US.
140	Telegram 254 to Guatemala City, November 27, 1963. Guatemalan plans for return to constitutional government. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 15 GUAT.

Honduras

141	Telegram 657 from Tegucigalpa, March 13, 1961. President Villeda Morales informed about threats to stability of his government. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/3-1361.
142	Telegram 705 from Tegucigalpa, April 3, 1961. Embassy assessment of President Villeda Morales' anti-Communist position. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/4-361.
143	Telegram 768 from Tegucigalpa, April 21, 1961. President Villeda Morales proposal to break relations with Cuba on April 22. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, 715.00/4-2161.

No.	Document Description
144	Letter from Ambassador Burrows to Katherine W. Bracken, January 24, 1962. Thoughts that OCI's reporting requirements reveal a distorted view of the situation in Honduras. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.00/1-2462.
145	Telegram 64 from Tegucigalpa, August 13, 1962. Country Team response to criticism and assumption in circular telegram 230. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.5/8-1362.
146	Telegram 51 to Tegucigalpa, September 11, 1962. Instructions for meeting with President and Foreign Minister to convey U.S. concern over implications for foreign investment, public and private, in Honduras agricultural development as result new agrarian reform law. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 815.16/9-1062.
147	Telegram 68 to Tegucigalpa, September 20, 1962. Transmits considerations pertinent to U.S. policy on assistance to American private interests abroad and problems arising from provisions of Honduran agrarian reform law. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 815.16/9-1962.
148	Memorandum of conversation, October 4, 1962, between Foreign Minister Alvarado and Edwin M. Martin. Honduran agrarian reform; request for assistance. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.04/10-462.
149	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, November 7, 1962. Visit of President Villeda Morales to the U.S. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 715.11/11-762.
150	Memorandum of conversation, November 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials. Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962-September 1963.
151	Memorandum of conversation, November 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials. Honduran agrarian reform and United Fruit Company. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962-September 1963.

No.	Document Description
152	Memorandum of conversation, November 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and President Villeda Morales and other U.S. and Honduran officials. The Swan Islands. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, December 1962-September 1963.
153	Memorandum of conversation, December 4, 1962, among Ambassador Burrows, Jasper Baker (United Fruit Company), Edward M. Rowell, and John W. Fisher. Honduran agrarian reform and United Fruit Company. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 715.04/12-462.
154	Memorandum of conversation, September 30, 1963, between Cottrell, and Ambassador Dávila and Finance Minister Bueso. Possible coup in Honduras. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
155	Telegram 84 to Tegucigalpa, 134 to Guatemala City, 69 to Managua, 143 to Panama, 111 to San José, and 81 to San Salvador, September 30, 1963. Rumors about impending coup in Honduras. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
156	Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, October 1, 1963. U.S.-Honduran dispute over the Swan Islands. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Honduras, 1961-1964.
157	Telegram 74 to Managua and 86 to San Salvador, October 2, 1963. Joint declaration by four American Republics presidents re impending coup. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
158	Memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Perdomo, Finance Minister Bueso, and Ambassador Dávila, and Cottrell and other U.S. officials. Request for U.S. assistance in holding back ongoing coup. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 26 HOND.
159	Telegram 94 to Tegucigalpa, October 4, 1963. Instructions re contact with members of former Villeda government and question of recognition. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Honduras, 10/1-5/63.

No.	Document Description
160	Telegram 101 to Tegucigalpa, 96 to San Salvador, 80 to Managua, 123 to San José, October 4, 1963. Eventual recognition of Honduran Government and restoration of normal relations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
161	Telegram 135 to San José, October 8, 1963. Personal message from President Kennedy to Villeda Morales. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
162	Telegram 126 to San Salvador, 106 to Managua, 159 to San José, October 17, 1963. Return to civilian constitutional government in Honduras. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
163	Telegram 159 to Tegucigalpa, October 26, 1963. Contacts with Lopez. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
164	Telegram 258 from Tegucigalpa, October 27, 1963. Conclusions from October 25 conversation with Lopez. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
165	Telegram 268 from Tegucigalpa, October 30, 1963. Analysis of position of military regime; policy considerations confront U.S.; Embassy course of action recommendations. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
166	Telegram 171 to Tegucigalpa, October 31, 1963. Approval of recommendations in telegram 268 from Tegucigalpa with specific comments. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.
167	Memorandum for Bromley Smith, November 1, 1963. Meeting among President Kennedy and other government officials on the current situation in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, 10/18-11/23/63.
168	Telegram 194 to Tegucigalpa, November 18, 1963. Return to civilian constitutional government. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 15 HOND.

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No.	Document Description
Jamaica	
169	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, April 3, 1961. Upcoming visit of Premier Manley of Jamaica. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
170	Memorandum of conversation, April 19, 1961, between President Kennedy and Premier Manley. West Indian Federation; U.S. assistance; bauxite, immigration, and aviation; sugar quotas. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
171	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, May 28, 1962. Visit of Premier Bustamante of Jamaica. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
172	Jamaican Scope Paper, undated. Independence; OAS membership; defense treaty; U.S. aid; sugar; bauxite; immigration. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
173	Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Premier Bustamante, and other U.S. and Jamaican officials, June 27, 1962. Economic situation in Jamaica; future of the Caribbean; West Indies; independence; emigration; migratory workers; sugar; tobacco production; AID project. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
174	Memorandum from Moscoso to McGeorge Bundy, July 12, 1962. Aid program in Jamaica. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
175	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, July 19, 1962. Establishment of an Embassy at Kingston, Jamaica. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1961-62.
176	Strategy Statement for Jamaica, February 15, 1963. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.

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No.	Document Description
177	Plan of Action for Jamaica beginning June 1, 1963. Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.
178	Memorandum of conversation, June 14, 1963, between Prime Minister Bustamante and President Kennedy and other U.S. and Jamaican officials. Jamaican quota; Jamaican development plan; Cuban refugees. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jamaica, 1962-63.

Mexico

179	Letter from Edward G. Cale to Thomas C. Mann, February 14, 1961. Transmits paper entitled "The Tactical Handling of Relations With Mexico." Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/2-1461.
180	Memorandum from Coerr to Ball, April 11, 1961. Mexican oil import problem. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 59, TFLA Subject and Chron Files: Lot 61 D 298, Box 9.
181	Memorandum from Melville E. Osborne to Coerr, May 6, 1961. Mexico and the Castro problem. Confidential. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 59, TFLA Subject and Chron Files: Lot 61 D 298, Box 9.
182	Memorandum from Edwin E. Vallon to Jamison, June 6, 1961. Mexican request for 10 minesweepers. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 712.5621/6-661.
183	Memorandum from Vallon to Braddock, July 26, 1961. Mexican request for purchase of navel vessels (20 minesweepers). Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 712.5621/7-2661.
184	Memorandum from Robert F. Woodward to U. Alexis Johnson, July 31, 1961. Politico-economic discussions with Mexico. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/7-3161.
185	Memorandum of conversation, October 10, 1961, between Foreign Minister Tello and Under Secretary Bowles. Berlin question; Troika (UN). Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/10-1961.
186	Telegram 1744 from Mexico City, December 17, 1961. Report on discussion with President Lopez Mateos. Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, January 1961-May 1962.

No.	Document Description
187	Memorandum of conversation, February 16, 1962, between Rusk and Ambassador Carrillo. Geneva Disarmament Conference and salinity of Colorado River water. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 397.5611-GE/2-1662.
188	Memorandum from McGhee to Woodward, March 7, 1962. Transmits memorandum entitled "The Salt Water Problem of the Mexicali and San Luis Valleys." No classification marking. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12322/3-762.
189	DOS Policy Directive PD/ARA-3.1, March 15, 1962. Mexico's protest on salinity of Colorado River water. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department and Agencies Series, DOS Policy Directives.
190	Despatch 1347 from Mexico City, April 27, 1962, transmitting April 26 memorandum of conversation between Foreign Minister Tello and Ambassador Mann. Mexican proposals re Chamizal and Ojinaga dispute. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.1232/4-2762.
191	Memorandum from Ambassador Mann to Edwin M. Martin, May 19, 1962. Salinity of Colorado River water. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12323/5-1962.
192	Memorandum from Roger Hilsman to Edwin M. Martin, June 13, 1962. Mexico and the Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 712.00/6-1362.
193	Memorandum of conversation, June 29, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Minister Tello. Flow of private capital. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
194	Memorandum of conversation, June 29, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Foreign Minister Tello. Salinity problem. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
195	Memorandum of conversation, June 29, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos and Foreign Minister Tello. Communism in Latin America. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

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No.	Document Description
196	Memorandum of conversation, June 30, 1962, between President Kennedy, President Lopez Mateos, and Foreign Minister Tello. Salinity problem on the lower Colorado River and other problems. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.12/6-3062.
197	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 10, 1962. Status of salinity problem on lower Colorado River and Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, June to September, 1962.
198	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, December 14, 1962. Sale of minesweepers to Mexico. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 712.5621/12-1462.
199	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, January 11, 1963. Status report on negotiations for settlement of Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.1231/1-1163.
200	Memorandum of conversation, February 15, 1963, between Ambassador Carrillo Flores and Robert M. Sayre. Current bilateral problems between the United States and Mexico. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
201	Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, February 27, 1963. Status report on Chamizal negotiations. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
202	Memorandum of conversation, February 28, 1963, between President Kennedy and Ambassador Carrillo Flores. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River and transit of Latin Americans through Mexico. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Mexico, General, March-June 1963.
203	Telegram 2494 to Mexico City, March 6, 1963. President's response to news conference question on Chamizal. Unclassified. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
204	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 29, 1963. Solution of the salinity problem on the lower Colorado River; recommendations of the DOS. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.

No.	Document Description
205	Memorandum of conversation, April 18, 1963, between Ambassador Carrillo Flores and Sayre. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
206	Memorandum from Edwin Martin to Acting Secretary Ball, May 22, 1963. Settlement of the Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
207	Memorandum of conversation, May 23, 1963, between Ball and Ambassador Carrillo Flores. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
208	Memorandum from George Ball to President Kennedy, May 24, 1963. Settlement of the Chamizal dispute. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
209	Memorandum from Edwin Martin to Chayes, June 20, 1963. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, POL 32-1 MEX-US.
210	Telegram 504 from Mexico City, August 21, 1963. Salinity problem on lower Colorado River. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
211	Telegram 508 to Mexico City, September 5, 1963. Transmits September 5 memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Ambassador Carrillo Flores re Chamizal dispute; salinity problem; Cuba; President Lopez Mateos' trip to Europe. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.
212	Memorandum of conversation, October 11, 1963, among Rusk, Udall, and other U.S. officials. Colorado River salinity problem. Limited Official Use. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 33-1 MEX-US.

Venezuela

213	Memorandum of conversation, March 31, 1961, between Foreign Minister Falcon Briceno and Thomas C. Mann, and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Venezuela's urgent need for financial assistance. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 731.5-MSP/3-3161.
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No.	Document Description
214	Memorandum of conversation, May 5, 1961, between Perez Guerrero and Bowles and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Request by the Special Financial Mission from Venezuela for U.S. assistance with its economic development program. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 331.
215	Memorandum of conversation, June 22, 1961, between President of the Chamber of Deputies Caldera, Ambassador Mayobre and Rusk and Ingersoll. Political situation in Venezuela. Official Use Only. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 731.00/6-2261.
216	Memorandum from Battle to Swank, October 16, 1961. Transmits memoranda of conversation, between Rusk and Foreign Minister Salcon-Briceño. Perez Jimenez extradition case; Cuban Problem. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 331.
217	National Intelligence Estimate No. 89-61, November 21, 1961. "The Situation in Venezuela." Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.
218	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Community development-housing/slum clearance project. Limited Official Use. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
219	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Oil imports problem. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
220	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Military assistance. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

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No.	Document Description
221	Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1961, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Refinancing Venezuelan external debt. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
222	Memorandum from Hilsman to Edwin M. Martin, May 29, 1963. Venezuela and the Alliance for Progress. Confidential. 8 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Venezuela, 1961–1962.
223	Memorandum of conversation, August 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Venezuelan defense requirements. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1–381.
224	Memorandum of conversation, August 30, 1962, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Smuggling of arms into Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1–381.
225	Memorandum from Clint E. Smith to the Latin American Policy Committee, September 21, 1962. Plan of action for Venezuela to March 2, 1964. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 611.31/9–2162.
226	Memorandum of conversation, February 19, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Petroleum issues. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.
227	Memorandum of conversation, February 19, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Balance of payments. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.

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No.	Document Description
228	Memorandum of conversation, February 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President Betancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Flight of capital from Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March-May 1963.
229	Circular airgram CA-10071 from Moscow, March 18, 1963. Cuban propaganda and subversive activities in Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March-May 1963.
230	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, April 30, 1963. Highlights of General Lansdale's report on Communist insurgency in Venezuela. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March-May 1963.
231	Telegram 446 to Caracas, November 21, 1963. President Betancourt's briefing of LA chiefs on Cuban arms cache. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, October-November 1963.

Cuba

November-December 1960

232	Briefing papers used to brief President-elect Kennedy, November 18. Covert action program to replace Castro government. Secret. 6 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 64-00352R, Box 4, US Govt-President, Memoranda, Letters, Reports re CIA Relations with President and Cabinet.
233	Memorandum from Joseph W. Scott to Livingston Merchant, December 6. Transmits memorandum recommending a program of covert action to remove the Castro regime. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov. 1960-Jan. 20, 1961.
234	Notes of a Special Group meeting, December 29. Overall plan for covert actions in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Meetings—Cuba.

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No.	Document Description
<i>January 1961</i>	
235	Paper prepared in the CIA, January 1961. Mission and concept of operation for action against Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee.
236	Briefing paper for Secretary of State-designate Rusk, January 1961. Presidentially authorized program to replace current Cuban Government with one suited to democratic ideals of Cuban people and compatible with long-range U.S. interests. Secret. 28 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba Task Force.
237	Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to McCone, January 2. Material for January 3 policy meeting on Cuba. Secret. 9 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan–Jul 1961.
238	Memorandum from Barnes to the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, January 17. Joint Planning Committee on Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960–Jan 29, 1961.
239	Memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Merchant, January 18. December 6 plan to overthrow the Castro regime. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960–Jan 20, 1961.
240	Memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Rusk, January 27. Recommendations from meeting on the Task Force on Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961.
241	Memorandum for the record, January 30. Briefing on strike force in Cuba, tactical plan for its use, and intelligence on the target. Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol 10, Chpts 5 & 6.
<i>February 1961</i>	
242	Memorandum from Chester L. Cooper to the US. Intelligence Board, February 11. Transmits a memorandum from Abbot Smith to Allan Dulles on probable international reactions to certain U.S. courses of action against the Castro regime. Top Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, General Maxwell Taylor Committee on Cuba, 28 Jan–21 May 1961.

No.	Document Description
243	Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to Rusk, February 16. Proposed transfer of Cuban trainees from Panama Canal Zone to the United States. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961—.
<i>March 1961</i>	
244	Memorandum from Barnes to the Deputy Director (Plans), March 1. Courses to take in immediate future in the Cuba project. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO, DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
245	Notes of a Special Group meeting, March 2. Guatemala involvement in Cuba project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs—Cuba.
246	Notes of a special Group meeting, March 8. Operational developments during the past week on the Cuba project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs—Cuba.
247	Memorandum from Barnes to Chief, WH-4, March 10. Transmits a checklist prepared by DCI on the Cuba project. Secret. 5 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
248	Memorandum prepared by Barnes, March 16. Reasons to pursue the "Z" plan versus the original "E" plan. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
249	Memorandum from Barnes to Chief, WH-4, March 21. Checklist of points raised by DCI on Cuba project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
250	Information report No. TDCS-3/469,582, March 27. Status report on opposition groups in Escambray region of Las Villas province. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, Jan 1961—.
<i>April 1961</i>	
251	Telegram 3811 to the CIA from Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 16. Strategic targets on D-day and timing of missions. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I.

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- | No. | Document Description |
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| 252 | Telegram 4681 from CIA to <i>Balgar</i> , April 17. Instructions for ships participating in Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II. |
| 253 | Telegram 4292 to CIA from Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 18. Report of unsuccessful attacks; request for approval later attack and use of contract crews. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I. |
| 254 | Telegram 7123 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 18. Approval of use of cargo aircraft to deliver napalm bombs and beach resupply schedule. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I. |
| 255 | Telegram 4455 from Agency personnel in Nicaragua to CIA, April 19. B-26 bombing schedule. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I. |
| 256 | Telegram 7237 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 19. Navy air support and cover granted for 1 hour. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II. |
| 257 | Telegram 7238 from CIA to Agency personnel in Nicaragua, April 19. Message to brigade re U.S. logistic support. Secret. 1 p. CIA/DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II. |
| 258 | Notes by General Eisenhower of April 22 meeting with President Kennedy. Failure of Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-69, Augusta-Walter Reed Series, Cuba (2), Box 1. |
| 259 | Chronology of Bay of Pigs operation from January 1960 to April 19, 1961, dated April 23. Top Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. |
| <i>May 1961</i> | |
| 260 | Memorandum from Jacob D. Esterline to the Chief, WH/4/PM, May 2. Straightening out dates of strike force concept for the Taylor Committee. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, vol III, Part III. |

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No.	Document Description
261	CIA memorandum, May 3. Detailed statement of the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-day air strike. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee.
262	Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to the Deputy Director (Plans), May 8. Propaganda, paramilitary, political, intelligence and budget actions to be taken resulting from Cuban invasion. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
263	Memorandum, May 24. Special Group consideration of the strike force concept. Secret. 12 pp. CIA, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-99679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol II.
264	Memorandum for the record, May 26. Post D-day supply drops review. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol I.
<i>June 1961</i>	
265	Memorandum from Allen Dulles to General Taylor, June 1. Summary of November 18, 1960, briefing of President-elect Kennedy on planned covert actions in Cuba. No classification marking. CIA, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B01285A, General Maxwell Taylor committee on Cuba, 28 Jan-21 May 1961.
266	Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, June 26. "Implications of Delivery of Soviet MIG Aircraft to Cuba." Secret. 3 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, May 1961-.
<i>July 1961</i>	
267	Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to the Chief, Covert Action Staff, July 3. Possible funding of Cuban Revolutionary Council. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
268	Draft memorandum for the files, July 17. Salient points of Woodward's July 14 report to Scott on a July 12 meeting at the White House. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961-.

No.	Document Description
269	Memorandum from Woodward to Bowles, July 20. Transmits memorandum for the Special Group on the program of covert action directed at the Castro regime. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961.
270	Memorandum from Woodward to Johnson, July 26. Transmits a memorandum for the Special Group on internal action operations against Cuba. Secret. 8 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961.
<i>August 1961</i>	
271	Memorandum from Coerr to Johnson, August 2. Transmits a memorandum for the Special Group on program of covert action directed at the Castro regime. Secret. 13 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 4, August 3, 1961.
<i>September 1961</i>	
272	Memorandum, September 6. Report on Castro's instructions to Dorticos re contact with American Embassy in Belgrade during Belgrade Conference. Secret. 1 p. DOS, INR/IL Historical files, Cuba, August 1961-.
273	Memorandum for the record, September 8. Meeting among Ball, Woodward, Bissell, Goodwin, et al., re policy with respect to the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba.
<i>October 1961</i>	
273A	Survey Report by CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick, October 1961. Survey of the Cuban Operation with Annexes. 216 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files, Job 85-00664R.
274	Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to Chief, WH-4, October 6. Confirmation of requests re Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity—Western Hemisphere—Cuba.
275	Memorandum to Park F. Wollam, October 6. Transmits paper entitled "What Would Happen If Castro Died?" Secret. 8 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 73-00853R, Box 1, WH Division Liaison with Department of State.

No.	Document Description
276	Memorandum for the Special Group, October 12. Cuban program report. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961.
<i>November 1961</i>	
277	Memorandum, November 4. Recommendations on subsequent actions in Cuban operation. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba.
278	Notes on conversation, November 9, between President Kennedy and Tad Sulz. Sulz' visit to Cuba and meeting with Castro; assassination of Castro. Top Secret. 1 p. NARA, RG 233, JFK Collection.
278A	Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to CIA Director Dulles, November 24. Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
<i>December 1961</i>	
278B	Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to CIA Director McCone, December 1. Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278C	Memorandum prepared by CIA Deputy Director Cabell, December 15. Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
<i>January 1962</i>	
278D	Analysis by CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, January 18. Report on the Cuban operation. 188 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278E	Letter from CIA Director McCone to President of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Killian, January 19. Forwards Kirkpatrick's survey of the Cuban operation and comments of other CIA officials. 1 p. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278F	Memorandum from CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Barnes to Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, January 19. Survey of the Cuban operation. 5 pp. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.

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No.	Document Description
278G	Memorandum from CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick to Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Barnes, January 22. Response to Barnes' January 19 memorandum commenting on Kirkpatrick's survey of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278H	Memorandum from the staff officers of the CIA Office of the Inspector General to CIA Inspector General Kirkpatrick, January 26. Kirkpatrick's Cuban survey and the Deputy Directory of Plans analysis of the Cuban operation. 2 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
278I	Memorandum from CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell to CIA Director McCone, January 27. Barnes memorandum on the IG Survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
<i>February 1962</i>	
278J	Memorandum from Allen W. Dulles to CIA Director McCone, February 15. IG's survey of the Cuban operation. 3 pp. Top Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R
278K	Letter from CIA Director McCone to Allen W. Dulles, February 19. Survey of the Cuban operation. 1 p. Secret. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85-00664R.
279	Program review by Brigadier General Lansdale, February 20. "The Cuba Project." Top Secret. 26 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62.
<i>March 1962</i>	
280	Memorandum from General Lansdale to the Special Group (Augmented), March 13, 1962. Institutional planning for Operation Mongoose. Top Secret. 15 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 482, Mongoose.
281	Memorandum from Barnes to Dulles, March 13. Cuban operation, July-September 1960. Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes—Chrono, Jan-June 1962.

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No.	Document Description
282	McCone's notes for discussion with Helms and Harvey, March 16. Operation Mongoose. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962.
<i>April 1962</i>	
283	Memorandum of discussion between Rusk and McCone, April 10. Rusk report on confidential discussion with Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas concerning Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962.
<i>May 1962</i>	
284	Memorandum for the record, May 17. Review of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
<i>June 1962</i>	
285	Memorandum for the record, June 25. Special Group (Augmented) decision on new SNIE on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
<i>July 1962</i>	
286	Notes of Special Group (Augmented) meeting, July 12. Operation Mongoose. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
287	Memorandum for the record, July 20. Review of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962.
<i>August 1962</i>	
288	National Intelligence Estimate No. 85-2-62, August 1. "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba." Secret. 13 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63.
289	Memorandum from William Harvey to McCone, August 8, with attached Operation Plan. Operation Mongoose future course of action. Top Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 841, 7 Aug 62-15 Aug 62.

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- | No. | Document Description |
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| 290 | Memorandum from Harvey to Carter, August 14. Operation Mongoose—assassination of Fidel Castro. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. |
| <i>September 1962</i> | |
| 291 | Telegram 72756 from McCone, September 4. Soviet military assistance to Cuba confirmed. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962. |
| 292 | Telegram 73741 from McCone, September 6. Confirmation of nine SAM sites in Cuba; Latin American Ambassadors asked to convene meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers to discuss Cuban developments. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962. |
| 293 | Telegram 18314 to McCone, September 7. Support for frequent reconnaissance missions; develop joint policies for action in Cuba with selected Caribbean and South American states. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights. |
| 294 | Telegram 74587 from McCone, September 8. Twelve SAMs confirmed and MIG-21 cited. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962. |
| 295 | Telegram 19372 to McCone, September 10. Appearance of secrecy measures being deployed in Cuba to cover Soviet offensive capability. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights. |
| 296 | Carter diary entry, September 10. Intelligence objectives behind overflights of Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. |
| 297 | Telegram 75341 from McCone, September 11. Exile group attacks two outward bound cargo ships from Cuba; BNE statement re Soviet motivations for MRBM installation. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962. |

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No.	Document Description
298	Telegram 21493 to McCone, September 13. Release of exiled Cuban prisoners; humanitarian support for Cuba; installation of defensive equipment. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.
299	Carter diary entry, September 14. Special Group (Augmented) meeting on low-level reconnaissance over Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
300	Telegram 23209 to McCone, September 16. Soviet Cuban buildup including possible MRBMs. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962.
301	Telegram 77871 from McCone, September 18. Review of SNIE 85-3 regarding Soviet buildup in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.
302	Telegram 78480 from McCone, September 19. Transmits conclusions of SNIE approved by USIB on September 19. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4, DCI-DDCI Cables—Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962.
303	Telegram 25591 to McCone, September 20. Comments on telegram 78480 transmitting SNIE conclusions. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.
304	Memorandum for the file, September 24. Discussion with the Attorney General on proposed Donovan negotiations for release of Cuban exile prisoners held by Castro. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
305	Memorandum of meeting with the President, September 25. Proposed Donovan negotiations for release of Cuban exile prisoners held by Castro. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

No.	Document Description
306	Memorandum of conversation between McCone and Eisenhower, September 26. Proposed Donovan project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
307	Notes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting, September 27. Mongoose balloon plan; Rostow paper on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
308	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Donovan and McCone, September 29. Plans for Donovan mission to Cuba to gain release of Cuban exile prisoners. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memo for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
<i>October 1962</i>	
309	Memorandum for the record, October 2. Results of Gilpatric meeting at the White House on Cuban trade. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 000.1-092.
310	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 2. Communist bases in Cuba. Confidential. 7 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
311	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 2. Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
312	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 3. Communist infiltration in Cuba. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
313	Memorandum of conversation among Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, October 3. Communist infiltration in Cuba. Confidential. 8 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
314	Memorandum from Sloan to Gilpatric, October 8. Release of Cuban prisoners. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA files: FRC 65 A 3591, Cuba 1962, 00.1 (383.6 Cuba).

No.	Document Description
315	Summary memorandum of discussions with Congressional leaders, October 8. Donovan project. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
316	Memorandum for the record, October 9. Summaries of meetings with the President and Vice President on the Donovan project. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
317	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Acting DCI Carter, October 13. Bundy's view of situation involving Donovan project and further responsibilities therefor. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.
318	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 15. Contingency planning for Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
319	Memorandum for the record by General Carter, October 17. Summary of October 16 NSC meeting with the President re latest U-2 photography indicating deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.
320	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 16. Medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
321	Memorandum from Carter to the Special Group (Augmented), October 16. Operation Mongoose/Sabotage Proposals. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.
322	Memorandum for the record, October 16. Meeting at the White House on Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Memos for the Record.
323	Memorandum of conversation between Carter and Hilsman, October 16. Failure of U.S. intelligence (with the exception of McCone) to predict development of Soviet missiles in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B1676R, Walter Elder, Recop.

No.	Document Description
324	Paper prepared by Sorensen, October 16. Questions U.S. should be prepared to answer in case Soviet missiles in Cuba cause the United States to initiate an armed attack that might lead to nuclear war. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, 1961-64, Cuba, General, 1962.
325	Memorandum from Dillon to the President, undated. Outlines Dillon's views on need to eliminate offensive weapons from Cuba and course of action to do so. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. III.
326	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 17. Five courses of action proposed at White House meeting evening of October 16. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
327	Gilpatric's handwritten notes of meeting, October 17. Preferred course of action. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.
328	Gilpatric's handwritten notes of meeting, October 17. U.S. position on missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, RLG's Notes re Cuba.
329	Memorandum for the file, October 17. Conversation between McCone and former President Eisenhower on Cuban developments. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
330	First State Strategic Paper, undated. Possible courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 14 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962.
331	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 18. Courses of action in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

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No.	Document Description
332	Standing Committee Paper, undated. Plan I—Limited one-time Strike against MRBM sites. Top Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, General and Historical Information 8/31/62-10/19/62.
333	Standing Committee Paper, undated. Option II—Blockade. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subjects Files 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, Standing Committee 9/62-10/62.
334	Standing Committee Paper, October 18. Option III—Invasion. Top Secret. 9 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. I.
335	Memorandum by McCone, October 18. Problems the USIB should address at next meeting on possible courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.
336	Joint Evaluation prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 18. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (5 Sept-19 Oct 1962).
337	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 19. CJCS summarized previous evening's meeting at the White House on reaction to photographic pictures of Cuban missile sites in Cuba; JCS position for meeting with the President; debrief on morning meeting at the State Department. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
338	Memorandum from McCone to USIB members, October 19. Transmits probable decision among principals to initiate a limited blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962.
339	Handwritten notes of meeting made by McCone, October 19. Possible courses of action in Cuba. No classification marking. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962.

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No.	Document Description
340	Memorandum prepared by McCone, October 19. Actions against the Soviet-Cuban military threat. Top Secret. 6 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962.
341	Paper prepared in the White House, October 19. The defense of Berlin if Cuba is blockaded. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/15-23/62.
342	Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 19. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (5 Sept-19 Oct 1962).
343	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 20. Various courses of action in response to Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
344	Supplement 1 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 20. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 8 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct-22 Oct 1962).
345	Paper, October 20. I—Air Strike Scenario. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. I.
346	Memorandum of conversation among the President, Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, General Taylor, McCone, October 21. Possible military courses of action in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
347	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 21. Debrief of meetings with the President on possible air strikes against Cuba, President's speech, and blockade of Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.

No.	Document Description
348	Telegram 6830 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Certain Military Commands, October 21. Possible reactions to initiation of blockade operations against Cuba and instructions to review applicable general war plans. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 10/16/62-10/21/62.
349	Circular telegram 700 to all Latin American posts, October 21. Instructions for Ambassadors following the President's nationwide TV statement on Soviet offensive nuclear capability in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2262.
350	Memorandum of discussion between the President and McCone, October 21. Conclusions of McCone's discussion with former President Eisenhower on military procedures to follow in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
351	Supplement 2 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 21. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct-22 Oct 1962).
352	Memorandum for the record, November 14. Report on Acheson's mission to Paris, October 22-24. Secret. 21 pp. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A, 29 May 72.
353	Excerpt from Ambassador Bruce's diary, October 21-25. Acheson's meetings in London. No classification marking. 10 pp. DOS, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327.
354	Memorandum for the file, October 22. Briefing of Vice President Johnson on October 21. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
355	Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, October 22. Possible initiatives and courses of action around the world as the Cuban crisis develops. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961-64, Cuba-Subjects, General & Historical Information, 10/20/62-10/25/62.

No.	Document Description
356	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 22. Briefing by General Carroll (Director DIA) on the MRBM sites in Cuba and U.S. responses to a missile attack. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
357	Memorandum for the record, October 22. Daily White House Staff Meeting on October 22 on Cuban crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.-Nov. 1962.
358	Telegram 6848 from the JCS to CINCLANT, October 22. Instructions to prepare for the blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 10/22/62.
359	Circular telegram 706 to selected ARA diplomatic posts, October 22. Transmits text of letter from President to respective chiefs of state about the U.S. response to the Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2262.
360	Telegram 1199 from Bonn, October 22. Briefing of Adenauer on Cuban crisis. Confidential. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.3722/1-2261.
361	Memorandum of conversation between Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Merchant, October 22. Meeting to deliver President's October 22 letter on Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-262.
362	Telegram 221822Z to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, October 22. Transmits letter from the President to General Norstad explaining U.S. actions in Cuban missile crisis and importance of NATO alliance. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2262.
363	Memorandum from Acting Director of the Office of National Estimates Smith to McCone, October 22. Soviet reaction to certain U.S. moves. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II.
364	Telegram from White House Situation Room to the Department of State, October 22. Transmits letter from President to Prime Minister Macmillan for Department's information and action. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UK-Cuba.

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No.	Document Description
365	Telegram 222308Z from the White House to Rusk, October 22. Transmits text of Macmillan letter to Kennedy re Soviet build up in Cuba to the Department. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2262.
366	Supplement 3 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 22. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 1, Cuba (20 Oct-22 Oct 1962).
<i>October 23, 1962</i>	
367	Circular telegram 726, October 23. Instructions to meet with highest available official to persuade government to which accredited to take actions to prevent Soviet Bloc military equipment from reaching Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-2362.
368	Memorandum for the record, October 23. Daily White House staff meeting, Bundy presiding re handling of crisis actions. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.-Nov. 1962.
369	Notes from transcripts of JSC meetings, October 23. Low-level reconnaissance; U.S. reaction to possible U-2 shootdown; blockade of Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
370	Memorandum of meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 23. Intelligence report, blockage, possible military actions, firing on a U-2, air intercept capability, and low-level flights. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01265A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
371	Memorandum for the file, October 23. Meetings with Senators Russell, Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson to notify them of administration policy and get their positions. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01265A, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

No.	Document Description
372	Memorandum from Acting Director of the Office of National Estimates Smith to McCone, October 23. Effect on Cuba of a Blockade covering all goods except food and medicines. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62.
373	List of issues raised at Rostow group meeting, October 23. Strategic guidelines, missile trade-off, offensive nature of missiles in Cuba, Soviet personnel in Cuba, inspection issue, initiative thinking, Cuban objectives, Tobin-Greenfeld paper, systematic review of possible contingencies. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book, Cuba, Vol. II.
374	Memorandum from Katzenbach to Attorney General Kennedy, October 23. Proclamation re Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Misc. Papers Regarding Cuba, 20 Oct.-25 Oct. 1962.
375	NSC Executive Committee Debriefing, October 23. Blockade of Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 75 D 165, NSC Debriefings 1962.
<i>October 24, 1962</i>	
376	Supplement 4 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 24. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).
377	Telegram 987 to Moscow, October 24. Transmits regulation of Secretary McNamara re submarine surfacing and identification procedures used by U.S. quarantine forces in vicinity of Cuba for transmittal to Soviet Government. Unclassified. 2 pp. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 23-24, 1962.
378	Telegram 1205 from Bonn, October 24. Briefing Chancellor on U.S. courses of action in Cuba and Chancellor's reaction. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2462.

No.	Document Description
379	Memorandum for the record, October 24. Daily White House staff meeting covering Navy preparations for intercepts, Nitze Berlin-NATO Subcommittee, Rostow subcommittee, duty officer assignments. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct.-Nov. 1961.
380	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 24. Debrief on ExComm meeting; ship movements; advantages of planes ready at airfields in Florida. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
381	Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, October 24. Report 1 of Planning Subcommittee: Blockade and future planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Planning Subcommittee, 10/62-11/62.
382	Telegram from General Norstad to McGeorge Bundy, October 24. Transmits letter to the President reporting on Norstad's trip to London. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Kennedy, John F.
383	Telegram 1458 from USUN to Rusk, October 24. Message from U Thant to President Kennedy re U Thant message to Khrushchev expressing concern over Soviet ships challenging the U.S. quarantine. Confidential. 2 pp. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 23-24, 1962.
384	Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk and Ball, October 24. Discussion of Cuba in the UN Security Council. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN-Cuba.
385	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, October 24. Briefing information for a call to the President from Macmillan; possible next steps on the political track. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).
386	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24. Timing for interception of ships at sea. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons-Cuba.

No.	Document Description
387	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Cleveland and Ball, October 24. Stevenson's position on U.S. statement before the United Nations. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
388	Supplement 5 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 24. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).
389	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, October 24. Khrushchev message to the President; interception of ships at sea. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
390	Circular telegram 743 to all diplomatic and consular posts, October 24. Guidance for U.S. officials at home and abroad for public and private discussions of Soviet bases in Cuba. Confidential. 13 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2462.
391	Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Ball, October 24. Response to Khrushchev message; possible interception of tanker at sea on the morning of October 25. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
392	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24. President's concern over challenging ship at sea; possible message for U Thant to give to sent to Khrushchev. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
393	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 24. No action planned during night of October 24-25; message to Khrushchev through U Thant. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

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No.	Document Description
<i>October 25, 1962</i>	
394	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, October 25. Report on Stevenson's conversation with U Thant on message to Khrushchev to hold off Soviet ships for discussion of situation. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
395	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and McGeorge Bundy, October 25. Response to Khrushchev message. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
396	CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, October 25. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memos Series, Excom, Vol. I, Mtgs 1-5.
397	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, October 25. Report on first intercept at sea; response to Khrushchev message. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
398	Memorandum for the record, October 25. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion on Soviet Bloc shipping headed for Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Group, Oct-Nov 1962.
399	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 25. Soviet acceptance of quarantine; procedures for boarding ships; reconnaissance flights; air blockade. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
400	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 25. Additional paragraph for response to Khrushchev letter from Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
401	Memorandum from Klein and Legere to McGeorge Bundy, October 25. Meeting of the Nitze subcommittee on Berlin-NATO. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Country Series, Germany, Berlin.

No.	Document Description
402	Memorandum from Kitchen to Nitze, October 25, enclosing memorandum from Raymond Garthoff to Rostow. Concern over the course and outcome of the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 092 Jan—.
403	Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, October 25. Soviet strategy in UN discussions of Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).
404	Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, October 25. Report No. 2 of Advance Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV (A).
405	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, October 25. Changes in draft message to U Thant. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
406	Paper prepared by Dillon's group, October 25. Scenario for airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Air Strike, Cuba.
407	Paper prepared in the Department of State, October 25. Political path including three political actions for consideration by the Executive Committee. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Action.
408	Executive Committee record of action, October 25. Military situation; political situation; military recommendations, message to U Thant. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5.
409	Memorandum for the record, October 29. Summary of Cooper's activities during his mission to London, October 21-25. No classification marking. 7 pp. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A, 29 May 72.
410	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Cleveland, October 25. Request that Stevenson come to Washington for discussions with the President and Rusk. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

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No.	Document Description
411	Memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and Ball, October 25. Report on Stevenson's planned trip to Washington. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
October 26, 1962	
412	Supplement 6 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 26. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).
413	Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 26. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.
414	Memorandum for the record, October 26. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion on press leaks, boarding of the <i>Marucla</i> , telegram from Lord Russell to the President. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct-Nov 1962.
415	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 26. CJCS debrief on meeting at the White House the previous evening; blockade issues; air reconnaissance; MRBMs. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
416	Memorandum for the file, October 26. Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee including intelligence briefings and discussion of operational problems. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
417	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 26. Planning for Cuba, status of quarantine, political measures, negotiation with U Thant. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. I, Meetings 1-6.

- | No. | Document Description |
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| 418 | Rough notes of Rostow committee meeting, October 26. Three courses of U.S. action—political, military, and economic—to pursue concurrently. Top Secret. CIA Files: Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850B, Vol. II. |
| 419 | Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, October 26. Khrushchev's conversation with W.E. Knox, President of Westinghouse Electrical International, in Moscow on October 24. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, General, Vol. VI(A), 10/26-27/62. |
| 420 | Memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 26. Forward planning thoughts on Cuba. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. II. |
| 421 | Memorandum from Komer to Rostow, October 26. Forward planning on Cuba vs. Cuban MRBMs. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, vol. II. |
| 422 | Memorandum from Kitchen to U. Alexis Johnson, October 26. Rostow subcommittee memorandum on negotiation. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Negotiations. |
| 423 | Telegram 936 from Rome, October 26. Italian Government position on withdrawal of Jupiter missile installations from Italy. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter—Cuba. |
| 424 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between Nitze and Ball, October 26. U.S. missile installations in Turkey. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. |
| 425 | Telegram 587 from Ankara, October 26. Embassy assessment of removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for Soviet removal of missiles in Cuba. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2662. |
| <i>October 27, 1962</i> | |
| 426 | Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 27. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962). |

No.	Document Description
427	Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 27. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10.
428	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 27. Briefing by General Carroll and Hughes of DIA; Soviet military personnel in Cuba; OPLANs 312 and 316; U-2 lost over Cuba; President's message to Khrushchev; Jupiter missiles in Turkey; retaliation for U-2 shot down over Cuba; photographic verification of nuclear weapons in Cuba; reconnaissance. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
429	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27. Soviet ships moving toward Cuba, size of quarantine zone, Soviet public statement, draft message to Khrushchev. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meeting, vol. V, Meetings 6-10.
430	Telegram 1970 from Paris, October 27. De Gaulle position on U.S. actions in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/1-2762.
431	Memorandum from Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, October 27. Report No. 4 of Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV(B).
432	Memorandum of conversation between Georgi Kornienko and Richard H. Davis, October 27. Transmittal of text of letter from Stevenson to Secretary General U Thant re delimitation of "interception area" in the waters around Cuba. Confidential. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 381, Jan-Oct.
433	Memorandum from Kitchen to Nitze, October 27. Transmits memorandum from Raymond Garthoff on Khrushchev's proposal for a Turkey-Cuba tradeoff. Secret Attachment. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962.
434	Memorandum prepared by Raymond Garthoff, October 27. The military significance of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2762.

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| 435 | Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, October 27. Khrushchev's proposal for trade-off of missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2762. |
| 436 | Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to Rusk, October 27. Probable Soviet response to U.S. retaliation against an SAM site. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2762. |
| 437 | NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27. Reconnaissance missions; message to U Thant; U-2 overflying the USSR; letter from the President to Khrushchev; military planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. |
| 438 | NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 27. Call up of air reserve squadrons; message for U Thant; calling up U.S. ships and adding POL to list of prohibited goods; message from General Norstad; message to Finletter. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. |
| <i>October 28, 1962</i> | |
| 439 | Supplement 8 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 28. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962). |
| 440 | Telegram 1234 from Bonn, October 28. Chancellor Adenauer's views on what actions United States should take now. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2861. |
| 441 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 28. Request for meeting with the President; MRBM sites operational; Khrushchev message (Moscow radio broadcast) that Soviets will stop building bases and dismantle equipment. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |

No.	Document Description
442	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, October 28. Transmits Rostow subcommittee October 27 paper on negotiations. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol IV(B).
443	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 28. Khrushchev message; blockade; air reconnaissance missions; public statement on Soviet decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba; press relations; reply to Khrushchev. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excon Meetings, vol. I, Meetings 6-10.
444	Debriefing by U. Alexis Johnson, October 28. Current situation in Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 75 D 265, NSC Debriefings 1962.
445	Telegram 1517 from USUN, October 28. Stevenson and Yost conversation with SYG on situation following latest Khrushchev letter to the President. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10-2861.
446	Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Alaphand, October 28. Latest developments in Cuba including Khrushchev's recent letter. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
447	Telegram 7065 from JCS to CINCLANT, CINCONAD, and CINCSAC, October 28. Instruction not to relax alert procedures despite latest Soviet proposal. Top Secret. 1 p. OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 25-31, 1962.
448	Letter from U Thant to the President, October 28, enclosing text of Secretary General's reply to Castro. Comments on President's spirit of cooperation and concern for peace. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.
449	Supplement 9 to Joint Evaluation prepared by Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and National Photographic Interpretation Center, October 28. Soviet missile threat in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Box 2, Cuba (23 Oct.-28 Oct. 1962).

No.	Document Description
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October 29, 1962

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| 450 | Memorandum for the record, October 29. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion of quarantine developments; Presidential TV statement; Berlin; AID in FY 64; aerial reconnaissance of Cuba by UN; critique of crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Oct-Nov 1962. |
| 451 | NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 29. Current intelligence on Cuba; establishment of Coordinating Committee; quarantine and aerial reconnaissance; air reserves call-up; UN arrangements for verification; agenda for new Coordinating Committee. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. |
| 452 | Memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 29. Report on Planning Group meeting and proposal for a U.S.-Soviet summit. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I. |
| 453 | Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 29. Jupiter missile deal; UN inspection and surveillance; U.S. readiness posture. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History. |
| 454 | Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Rusk, October 29. Quarantine inspection at sea; UN weapon inspections in Cuba; disarmament. No classification marking. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, (McN Working Papers) |
| 455 | NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 29. UN developments; IRC inspections; on-site inspections; lifting of U.S. quarantine; inspection system; political developments. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. |
| 456 | Telegram 909 from Rio de Janeiro, October 29. General Albino to visit to Havana to talk with Castro. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/10-2962. |

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No.	Document Description
457	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, October 29. Post mortem on Cuba. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. IV(B).
<i>October 30, 1962</i>	
458	Memorandum for the record, October 30. Daily White House staff meeting including discussion of aerial surveillance; communications with Latin America; Executive order on shipping restrictions to Cuba; press leaks; press speculation re intelligence gathering; Cuban exiles; Adenauer visit; Nitze Subcommittee. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Chairman's Staff Meetings.
459	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 30. Current intelligence; U-1 flights; press restrictions; Executive order on Cuban shipping; Cuban exiles. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.
460	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 30. Briefing by DIA re October 29 photography of missile sites in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
461	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, October 30. Points to consider in current negotiations on the removal of Soviet offensive capabilities from Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, OASD/ISA Files; FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 381 Jan-Oct.
462	Memorandum from McCone to the Attorney General, McNamara, Rusk, and General Taylor, October 30. Information on intelligence collecting infiltration and guerrilla warfare teams. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62.
463	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, October 30. Guarantees from Cuba with respect to subversive activities. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/10-3062.

No.	Document Description
464	List of Outstanding Issues prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, October 30. List covers: theory of operation; short-term verification requirements; long-term verification requirements; political arrangements. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. IV(b).
<i>October 31, 1962</i>	
465	Memorandum Prepared for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 31. The Crisis: USSR/Cuba. Top Secret. 8 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11.
466	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 31. DIA briefing on latest photographs; State instructions for UN negotiations; reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
467	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 31. Inspection procedures; President's press conference; draft instructions to UN Mission; reconnaissance missions; quarantine. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Excom Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.
468	Memorandum of conversation between Llewellyn Thompson and Zhukov, October 31. Summit meeting; Soviet Cuban policy; quarantine; verification measures; Indian-Chinese dispute; test ban treaty. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. IV(B).
469	Circular telegram 807, October 31. U Thant discussions with Castro re verification measures. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 73756361.10-3162.
470	Memorandum from Stevenson to McCloy, Ball, and Gilpatric, October 31. Next steps in Cuban crisis. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN-Cuba.
471	Telegram 1153 to USUN, October 31. Instructions for New York negotiations on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Department of Defense, OSD, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense, Cable Files, Cuba, Oct 25-31, 1962.

No.	Document Description
472	Memorandum prepared by McCone, October 31. A history of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba with a September 11 attachment entitled "Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba." Top Secret. 11 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 September-31 December 1962.
473	NSC Executive Committee record of action, October 31. U Thant-Castro talks; aerial surveillance; quarantine; USIA broadcasts to Cuba; discussions with Russian officials. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, Vol, II, Meetings 11-16.
474	Memorandum of meeting of NSC Executive Committee, October 31. Report of photographic evidence of movement of missiles in Cuba; discussion in New York. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-31 December 1962.
<i>November 1962</i>	
475	Telegram 1585 from USUN, November 1. Summary of U Thant's preliminary report of his visit to Cuba. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Psalm Documents.
476	Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 1. Cuban Crisis Negotiations: the situation in Cuba; Soviet Bloc shipping to Cuba; 2 annexes. Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11.
477	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 1. Debrief of Executive Committee meeting November 1; reconnaissance flights; preparations for operation against Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
478	Telegram 1606 from USUN, November 2. Encloses text of letter and enclosure Stevenson sent to Mikoyan re U.S. list of offensive weapons. Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.

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No.	Document Description
479	Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 2. The situation in Cuba; Bloc developments; Bloc military status; Soviet block shipping to Cuba; and one annex. Top Secret. 9 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Excom Meetings, vol. II, Meetings 6-11.
480	Memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, November 2. Situation in light of Mikoyan talks and Castro speech. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: lot 65 D 438, Political Actions.
481	Telegram 1177 to USUN, November 2. Transmits questions to clarify in conversations with the Soviets. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1953-1963.
482	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Gilpatric, November 3. Status of IL-28s in Cuba; planned high-level flights over national waters. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons-Cuba.
483	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and McCloy, November 3. Status of IL-28s in Cuba; notification to Soviets of unacceptable IL-28 activity in Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons-Cuba.
484	Memorandum from General Joseph Carroll to McNamara, General Taylor, and the Director of the Joint Staff, November 3. Status of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
485	Memorandum for the record, November 3. NSC Executive Committee meeting including discussion of hidden missiles in Cuba; Cuban SAM program; effect of quarantine; overflight program; inspection arrangements; no invasion guarantee. Top Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
486	NSC Executive Committee record of actions, November 3. Low-level sorties over Cuba; inspection arrangements. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.

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No.	Document Description
487	Draft instruction to USUN for consideration by the Executive Committee, undated. Inspection arrangements for Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba.
488	Memorandum from Llewellyn E. Thompson to Rusk, November 3. Notes of a conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson on November 3 re verification arrangements. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II.
489	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 3. Presidential instruction on present negotiations on Cuba; progress on inspection negotiations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.
490	Memorandum from Cline to McCone, November 3. Time factors in construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962.
491	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 5. Aerial reconnaissance missions; McCloy-Kuznetsov discussions at UN. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.
492	Memorandum of NSC Executive Committee meeting by McCone, November 5. Overflights of Cuba; inspection procedures; reciprocal UN inspections. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, Box 6, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
493	Paper by George B. McManus, November 5. Demise of Operation Mongoose. Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers.
494	Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5. Guidance for procedures for adequate verification that USSR has removed offensive equipment from Cuba. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-562.

No.	Document Description
495	Draft letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev, November 5, enclosing draft telegram to USUN. List of weapons in Cuba that the United States considers to be offensive. Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Subjects File, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62.
496	Memorandum from McNaughton to Nitze, November 5. U.S. "anti-invasion" guarantee in the Cuban settlement. Top Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Historical Files, Cuba, November 1962.
497	Memorandum from Forrestal to Bundy, November 5. Comments on Presidential instructions on Cuban negotiations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. V(A).
498	Telegram 1642 from USUN, November 6. Report of 3-1/2 hour meeting Stevenson and McCloy had with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich. Secret. 4 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.
499	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 6. Approved letter to Khrushchev; IL-28 bombers; broadcasts to Cuba; air reconnaissance mission; refugee reports on Soviet missiles hidden in Cuban caves. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17-24.
500	Memorandum of telephone conversation among Gilpatric, Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, November 6. Preparations for meeting with Kuznetsov: SAM activations; aerial inspection; IL-28s; verification; re-introduction of arms assurance. No classification marking. 3 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
501	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings; November 7. General Wheeler visit to Army units in the field; briefing by DIA; reconnaissance; OPLAN 316. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
502	Memorandum for the record, November 7. Briefing of former President Eisenhower at Gettysburg on Cuban developments. Secret. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.

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No.	Document Description
503	Memorandum from Nitze to the NSC Executive Committee, November 7. Suggested course of action if a U.S. surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/62.
504	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, November 7. Recommended U.S. reaction to hostile attack of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.
505	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 7. Current intelligence; Naval checking of Soviet ships; reconnaissance missions; surveillance; unresolved issues. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17-24.
506	Telegram 1684 from USUN, November 8. Report on meeting between Yost and Wellborn and Morozov and Mendelevich to clarify aspects of alongside inspection of outgoing Soviet vessels and ICRC procedures. Top Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (TS, Exdis, etc.)
507	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 8. Press release; long-term surveillance requirements; courses of action in event a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot or destroyed; ways to keep pressure on Castro; aerial reconnaissance mission. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. II, 17-24.
508	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, November 8, covering a memorandum from Hurwitch to Martin. Approach to Castro through Carlos Lechuga. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-862.
509	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 9. Surveillance requirements. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
510	Telegram 1703 from USUN, November 9. Meeting between Ruegger and Borsinger (ICRC) and McCloy and Yost re Cuban consent to proposed inspection operation. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-962.

No.	Document Description
511	Telegram 1709 from USUN, November 9. Kuznetsov allegations that three Soviet ships sailing from Cuba to USSR were improperly searched by U.S. vessels. Secret. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.
512	Telegram 1710 from USUN, November 9. Report of follow-on conversation between McCloy and Kuznetsov based on telephone conversation between McCloy and Gilpatric re Kuznetsov allegations that U.S. vessels improperly searched Soviet ships. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.
513	Memorandum for the record, November 13. Record of November 10 meeting between Rusk and McCone re the future of Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI Memos for the Record, 24 Sept-31 Dec 1962.
514	Memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, November 10. Recent Cuban developments: analysis of low-altitude photography and verification of cargoes on Soviet ships. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62.
515	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 12. Blockade; disengaging Soviets from Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
516	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 12. U.S. forces state of readiness; current intelligence summary; political situation; negotiations with Russians at UN; form of assurance against U.S. invasion of Cuba; reliability of refugee reports; arrangements to ensure that Soviet offensive weapons cannot be secretly introduced into Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NFS, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24.
517	Memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, November 12. Suggested DOD position on Ball memoranda to the President. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962.

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No.	Document Description
518	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, November 12. Draft of proposed statement prepared for UN Security Council re "no-invasion" guarantee with respect to Cuba in the event the IL-28s are removed and satisfactory on-ground verification is achieved. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI(A).
519	Memorandum of Executive Committee meeting by McCone, November 12. Military equipment in Cuba; aerial surveillance; Cuban refugee report re number of missiles in Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1961.
520	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 12. Khrushchev's reply to Kennedy November 6 letter; safeguards against offensive weapons in Cuba; aerial reconnaissance missions for November 13. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NFS, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. II, Meetings 25-32A.
521	Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, November 13. Chief JCS debriefing of November 12 and 13 Executive Committee meetings; UN negotiations; courses of action in Cuba crisis; Khrushchev's letter. Secret. 4 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
522	Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk and Ball, November 13, enclosing a draft Cuban contingency paper. Courses of action if Soviets stall on removal of IL-28s from Cuba. Top Secret. 13 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Psalm Documents.
523	Memorandum for McNamara, November 13. Quarantine operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files, Black Book, Cuba, Vol. III.
524	Memorandum for the record, November 13, prepared by Colonel Julian J. Ewell, covering a JCS paper entitled "Assessment of Increased Conventional Military Capabilities of Cuban and Soviet Units in Cuba." Secret. 10 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.

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No.	Document Description
525	Telegram 1762 from USUN, November 13. Summary of 4-hour conversation between U.S. and Soviet negotiators on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-1362.
526	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Gilpatric and Ball, November 14. Status of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on UN inspection and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. No classification marking. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272.
527	DOD/ISA draft paper, November 14. "Some Lessons From Cuba." Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI (A).
528	Telegram 1781 from USUN, November 14. Status of present U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1462.
529	Memorandum for the NSC Executive Committee from Nitze, November 14. Relationship of Cuban objectives to present decisions. Top Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).
530	Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, November 15. Talking paper for discussion with the President. Secret. 2 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.
531	Telegram 1795 from USUN, November 15. Mission comments on UN working paper on safeguards and verification. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.663.61/11-1562.
532	Telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. Transmits verbatim text of Soviet and Cuban proposed protocol. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-1562.
533	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 16. Aerial surveillance; status of UN negotiations; long-term verification; policy re invasion of Cuba; daily aerial reconnaissance; courses of action in event surveillance plane is shot at or destroyed. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.

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No.	Document Description
534	Memorandum of meeting of Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, November 16. Discussion of intelligence briefing by McCone; report on recent communications by Rusk; removal of IL-28s; high-level reconnaissance flights; Soviet military strength in Cuba; and four actions for CIA. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
535	Telegram 1288 to USUN, November 16. Comments on UN working paper on safeguards and verification. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1662.
536	Telegram 1833 from USUN, November 16. Report of Yost meeting with SYG on U.S. difficulties with UN working paper: verification of withdrawal, safeguards against introduction of nuclear weapons, and assurances against invasion. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1662.
537	Telegram 1835 from USUN, November 16. Proposed text of letter and draft declaration for early submission to Soviets at UN in effort to move toward agreement on all outstanding points. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1662.
538	Memorandum from J.J. Ewell to General Taylor, November 16, covering a draft memorandum for the President in response to a request for further information on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
539	Letter from Rusk to McCloy, November 17. Guidance for McCloy's meeting with Kuznetsov on November 18. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1762.
540	CIA memorandum prepared for the Executive Committee of the NSC, November 19. The situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA—Cuba.
541	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 19. Summary of weekend intelligence; McCloy-Kuznetsov latest talk; high-level reconnaissance flights; Presidential press statements; review of political and military actions. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.

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No.	Document Description
542	Telegram 2645 to Paris; 1703 to Bonn, November 19. Transmits text of personal message from Kennedy to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan. Secret. 4 pp. DOS, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.
543	Memorandum for members of the NSC Executive Committee from Brubeck, November 19. Transmits three INR papers entitled: "Soviet-Cuban Reactions to U.S. Retaliation for Attack on U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft"; "Prospects for Overthrowing Castro From Within"; and "Negotiations on Cuba: The Advantages of Stalemate." Secret. 18 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926 Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).
544	Cuba Contingency Plan, November 20. Consisting of three parts: "Advice to NATO and OAS Governments regarding possible Cuban developments and U.S. action"; "Overflights and responses"; "Additional steps to be taken in the event IL-28s not removed." Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Vol. VI (B), 11/16/72-11/20/62.
545	Telegram 1862 from USUN, November 19. Probable course negotiations with USSR will take to wind up current Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-1962.
546	Telegram 1865 from USUN, November 19. Concerns on draft Presidential statement forwarded to Stevenson by Johnson on November 17. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 373.56361/11-1962.
547	Memorandum of meeting of the NSC Executive Committee by McCone, November 19. Cuban contingency plan of November 19; proposed messages to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan; proposed resolution to OAS; President's press conference. Top Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A.
548	Telegram Polto 577 from Paris, November 20. Report on Ball presentation on Cuba situation to the NAC. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/11-2062.
549	Memorandum for the record, November 21. Daily White House staff meeting: Public opinion on Cuba; Latin Americans position re Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Group, Oct-Nov 1962.

No.	Document Description
550	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 21. UN negotiations with the Russians; aerial reconnaissance plan. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32A.
551	Memorandum for the record, November 21. Report of telephone call to Kuznetsov from McCloy re draft of proposed U.S. declaration assuring against the invasion of Cuba. Confidential. 1 p. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001, IA, October/November Meetings.
552	Letter from McCone to McGeorge Bundy, November 22. Non-invasion of Cuba pledge. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VI (B), 11/21/62-11/30/62.
553	Memorandum from Cleveland to Ball, November 22. Transmits three drafts of the two main versions of the non-invasion pledge still under discussion. Top Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, General, Cuba, Vol. VI (B), 11/21/62-11/30/62.
554	Memorandum from Sorensen to President Kennedy, November 22. Wrapping up the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961-64, Cuba—Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/62.
555	Telegram 1942 from USUN, November 25. Kuznetsov-McCloy telephone conversation re Soviet questions about proposed U.S. declaration. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/11-2562.
556	Telegram 1953 from USUN, November 26. Reports on meeting with Secretary General about latest Cuban developments. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF 737.56361/11-2662.
557	Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 28. U.S.-Soviet meeting re U.S. draft declaration. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/1-2862.
558	Letter from Henry S. Rowen to Fred S. Hoffman, November 28. Expresses appreciation for Rand Corporation's quick response to DOD request for estimation of the threat posed by Soviet IRBMs if stationed in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962.

No.	Document Description
559	Memorandum prepared for the NSC Executive Committee, November 29. Bloc military forces; bloc shipping to and from Cuba; Cuban internal situation; Soviet position. Top Secret. 7 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 60 D 438, OA—Cuba.
560	NSC Executive Committee record of action, November 29. Refugee reports of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba; New York discussions with Mikoyan; longer-range plan to keep pressure on Castro; overflights of Cuba; press interest in post-mortem of Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62.
<i>December 1962</i>	
561	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, December 2. Refutation of Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson's dissension from the Executive Committee consensus. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba 1961-1963.
562	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Ball, December 3. Request by McCloy to wrap up negotiations with Kuznetsov. No classification marking. 1 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.
563	Memorandum of meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, December 3. Stevenson's report on the three areas of disagreement with the Soviets, and McCone's expression of concern over Soviet conduct in Cuba to the President at a later meeting. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B012285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
564	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, December 3. Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, 1961-1963.
565	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCloy and Ball, December 3. McCloy report of 5-1/2 hour conversation with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelovich. No classification marking. 5 pp. DOS, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba.

No.	Document Description
566	Telegram 2104 from USUN, December 4. Transmits verbatim text of Cuban draft declaration. Secret. 5 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC: 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963.
567	Telegram 2106 from USUN, December 4. Report of afternoon meeting with Soviets. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-462.
568	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, December 5. Letter from the President to Stevenson as possible solution to the Alsop-Bartlett story on Stevenson. No classification marking. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN-Cuba.
569	Letter from the President to Stevenson, December 5. Expresses regret over statements in the press by Alsop and Bartlett and support for Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. Princeton University, Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, John F. Kennedy.
570	Memorandum of Executive Committee meeting by McCone, December 6. Intelligence briefing; Mikoyan visit to Cuba; UN negotiations; U.S. actions in event of Cuba-supported insurgency or civil war in Cuba; position paper. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962.
571	Telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6. Transmits modifications in U.S. draft statement on Cuba for presentation to Soviet negotiators. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF 737.56361/12-662.
572	Telegram 1512 to USUN, December 6. Transmits draft U.S. statement on Cuba for presentation in Security Council. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-662.
573	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to members of the NSC Executive Committee, December 6, covering an FBI report on Mikoyan's briefing of the Soviet delegation in New York. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, NSC Executive Committee.
574	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Stevenson and Ball, December 6. Outcome of President's letter of support to Stevenson. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, UN-Cuba.

No.	Document Description
575	Draft telegram to USUN, December 6. Instructions for negotiations with the Soviets. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-662.
576	Memorandum from Gilpatric to the Secretary of the Army, December 8. Future plans for Cuban Volunteer Inductee Program. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 72 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program.
577	NSC Executive Committee record of action, December 10. UN negotiations on Cuba; broadcasts by Cuban refugees. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meeting, Vol. III, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62.
578	Telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12. Transmits changes to shorten the draft text before submitting joint report to Kuznetsov. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/12-1262.
579	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, December 17. Planning for contingencies of uprisings within Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (A), 12/62.
580	Memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, December 18. New Soviet proposal for settlement of Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/12-1862.
581	Telegram 2416 from USUN, December 19. Discussion of Soviet proposal at luncheon at Soviet Mission. Secret. USUN Files: NYFRC: 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings.
582	Note from General Clifton to General McHugh, December 20. Transmits McCone's request that the President see the attached memorandum. Rising world sugar prices and the effect on Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.
583	Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara, December 26. Reassessment of the alert posture for forces committed to Cuban operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962.

No.	Document Description
584	Memorandum from L.J. Legere to McGeorge Bundy, December 28. Alert posture for forces committed to Cuban operations. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (A), 12/62.
585	Telegram 2541 from USUN, December 31. U.S.-Soviet discussion on latest Cuban developments including U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, 737.5661/12-3162.
<i>January 1963</i>	
586	Telegram 2558 from USUN, January 2. Transmits verbatim text of Soviet letter to UN Secretary General. Confidential. 3 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
587	Telegram 2587 from USUN, January 4. U.S.-Soviet discussion on U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. 3 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
588	Telegram 2600 from USUN, January 4. Confirmation of changes made in U.S. draft declaration. Confidential. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
589	Memorandum of telephone conversation among, Rusk, Ball, and U. Alexis Johnson, January 5. Release and transport of prisoners and Americans in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
590	Telegram 2617 from USUN, January 5. Arrangements for signature of U.S. draft of joint letter. Confidential. 2 pp. USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-001 1-B December/January Meetings.
591	Memorandum for the record, January 7. Meeting between McCone and James B. Donovan re outstanding issues in Bay of Pigs operation. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-01258A, Box 2, Memos for Record.

No.	Document Description
592	Memorandum for the record, January 9. Leadership meeting on January 8. Attached DCI Briefing on latest overview of Cuban developments. Top Secret. 5 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings With the President, 1 January-31 March 1963.
593	Memorandum from Rusk to President Kennedy, January 9. Briefing memorandum for Kuznetsov's call on the President January 9. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, CF, 033.1161/1-963.
594	Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Kuznetsov and other U.S. and Soviet officials, January 10. U.S.-Soviet relations. Secret. 3 pp. DOS, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
595	Memorandum for the record, January 12. Discussion during a meeting with the President of Cuban aerial reconnaissance. Secret. 3 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March, 1963.
596	Memorandum from McCone to McGeorge Bundy, January 15. McCone's views on surveillance of the Soviet ship <i>Simferopol</i> . Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. III.
597	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 15. Progress report of Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs: Pan American/Prisoner exchange package; the Brigade; future policy toward Cuba; press interest. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
598	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 17. Progress report of the Cuban Coordinating Committee: the Brigade; the Miami Office; OAS resolutions. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
599	CIA Current Support Brief, January 19. "The Cuban Economy in 1961 and 1962 and Prospects for 1963 through 1965." Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label.

No.	Document Description
600	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 21. Transmits three draft papers of the Cuban Coordinating Committee for use by the Executive Committee. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
601	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy, January 21. Topics for President's discussion before NSC at January 22 meeting including President's personal judgment of the events in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 508, 1/22/63.
602	Talking Paper for the Chairman of the JCS, January 24. Papers for NSC Executive Committee meeting on January 25: U.S. policy toward Cuba, the use of the OAS, U.S. policy toward the Cuban Brigade. Top Secret. 5 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, NSC Actions, 19 Nov. 62-28 Feb. 63.
603	Memorandum from Cottrell to the NSC Executive Committee, January 25. Future of the Cuban Brigade. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2463.
604	Memorandum from Cottrell to the NSC Executive Committee, January 25. Current problems concerning Cuba. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2463.
605	Memorandum from Helms to Cottrell, undated. Reaction in the Cuban exile community and Brigade to the Attorney General's no air support statements. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 737.00/1-2563.
606	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 28. Latest developments at the Department of State on Cuba: Donovan's trip to Cuba, the Brigade, intelligence problems, Cuban Coordinating Committee meetings. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.
607	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, January 30. Latest developments in Cuba situation: the Brigade, psychological program, planning, meetings. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B), 1/63.

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No.	Document Description
608	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, January 30. Cuba shipping. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220.
<i>February 1963</i>	
609	Memorandum from McCone to General Taylor, February 1. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Memos for the Record, Box 2.
610	Circular telegram 1365 to all Latin American diplomatic posts, February 5. Message over U.S. concern over Cuban shipping question to convey to host government officials. Confidential. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Cuba, 1963.
611	Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to McNamara, February 5. Cuba shipping restrictions. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, Foreign Policy History Files: FRC 330277-131, Chron File—Cuban Affairs.
612	Report prepared for the Executive Committee, February 5. Soviet Forces in Cuba. Top Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. IV, 34-42.
613	Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence, February 6. Current status of Soviet military forces and equipment in Cuba. No classification marking. 9 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence.
614	Memorandum for record, February 6. Meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC re Cuban situation including overflights, incoming Soviet ship. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963.
615	Memorandum from President Kennedy to McNamara, February 11. Request for views on reconnaissance flight instructions. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 1896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963.
616	Memorandum for the record, February 14. Daily White House staff meeting: Soviet troops in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Feb 1963.

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No.	Document Description
617	Aide-Mémoire from the Soviet Government to the U.S. Government, February 18. Notification of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba of several thousand Soviet personnel before the middle of March. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba, General, 1/63-3/63.
618	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, February 18. Cuban Coordinating Committee progress report: contingency planning, the Brigade, American prisoners, Cuban subversive training of Latin Americans, action in the UN. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII(B), 2/63.
619	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to General Taylor, February 19. Transmits the President's request for ways and means to shorten the 18-day lead time in contingency planning for an invasion of Cuba. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, vol. VII(B), 2/63.
620	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Hilsman and Ball, February 20. Numbers of weapons in Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
621	Memorandum for the U.S. Intelligence Board, February 21. Transmits approved report entitled "Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba." Secret. 6 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963.
622	Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 85-2-63, February 21. "Reactions to U.S. Low-level Overflights of Cuba." Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.
623	Memorandum from McCone, February 27. Transmits background paper on U-2 overflights of Cuba from August 29 to October 14, 1962. Secret. 12 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis, Miscellaneous.
624	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, February 26. Progress report of the Cuban Coordinating Committee. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (B) 2/63.

No.	Document Description
625	Memorandum of discussion among McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson and McCone, February 28. Situation in Cuba and U.S. long-range plans for dealing with Castro and the Soviet presence in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2.
<i>March 1963</i>	
626	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McCone, March 6. State Department changes to McCone's February 27 memorandum on U-2 overflights of Cuba, August 29-October 14, 1962. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba-Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV.
627	Memorandum from McCone to U. Alexis Johnson, March 7. Reply to the State Department's memorandum commenting on McCone's February 27 memorandum on U-2 overflights of Cuba, August 29-October 14, 1962. DCS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.
628	Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 9. U.S. air surveillance of Cuba. Confidential. 6 pp. DOS, CF, POL 31-1 CUBA-US.
629	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the National Security Council, March 11. Background material for March 13 meeting of the NSC. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509.
630	Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 11. Report on conversation between Trevelyan and Khrushchev concerning concessions Soviets made to the United States in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 17-1 UK-USSR.
631	Memorandum for the record, March 13. Discussion between McCone and the President on latter's final meeting with the Stennis Committee on criticisms directed toward the CIA during the Cuban missile crisis. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963.
632	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, March 13. McCone's report on Cuban intelligence prior to the October crisis. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 38, Miscellaneous.

No.	Document Description
633	Telegram 2321 from Moscow, March 17. Meeting between Kuznetsov and Kohler re President's private communication to Khrushchev. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL CUBA-USSR.
634	Memorandum from FitzGerald to McCone, March 19. Outline of a program to exacerbate and stimulate disaffection in the Cuban Armed Forces. Secret. 6 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.
635	Intelligence Note from Hilsman to Rusk, March 27. "Soviet Response to Two Attacks on Their Freighters Off Cuba." Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exiles—3/63.
636	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 27. Cuba Coordinating Committee. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, VII CC, 3/63.
637	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 27. Secret raid by L-66 exile group. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
638	Telegram 2422 from Moscow, March 27. Transmits text of note from Soviet Government re attack on Soviet cargo vessel in Cuban port. Official Use Only. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
639	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 28. Activist exile groups. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
640	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, March 29. Cuba Coordinating Committee—latest developments. Top Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII CC, 3/63.
641	Current Intelligence Memorandum, March 29. Movement of SAM launch sites in Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV.

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No.

Document Description

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- 642 Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 1. Transmits memorandum from Hurwitch to the Attorney General on actions and recommendations to prevent pin-prick raids against Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. DOS, CF, POL 30-2CUBA.
- 643 Memorandum from Gordon Chase to Dungan, April 2. Cuban exiles. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exiles 4/63.
- 644 Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, April 2. Propaganda inciting Cubans within Cuba to attack Soviet troops. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General Vol. VIII (A), 4/1-4/20/63.
- 645 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 3. Alpha 66 raid of March 17-18; the press conference held by Cubans in Washington; the San Jose Conference. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba—Subjects, Exile Activities.
- 646 Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Greenfield, April 3. Report out of La Paz on a conversation between Donovan and Castro, which would lead to coexistence between Castro and the United States if Castro met certain conditions. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
- 647 Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, April 5. Analysis of possible causes and motives behind Khrushchev's message passed to the Attorney General on April 3. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963.
- 648 Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, April 6. Memorandum of conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson, April 6. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963.

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No.	Document Description
649	Memorandum for the record by McCone, April 10. Executive Committee of the NSC meeting including: Donovan negotiations; aerial surveillance. 3 pp. Secret. CIA, DCI McCone Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963.
650	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, April 11. U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—.
651	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 12. Time to begin long-range planning aspects for Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group, 4/63-5/63.
652	Memorandum from Schlesinger to the President, April 13. Miro Cardona statement. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba II.
653	Memorandum for the record by L.J. Legere, April 15. Daily White House staff meeting, including: Miro Cardona statement. Secret. 2 pp. NDU, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, March-April 1963.
654	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, April 17. Rusk's speech before American Society of Newspaper Editors; Miro resignation; support to CRC. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. VII (D), 4/1-4/20/63.
655	Paper prepared by the CIA, April 17. "Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the Castro Communist Regime." Top Secret. 11 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Book I—Special Group.
656	Memorandum from Sherman Kent to McCone, April 19. Comments on proposed new covert policy and program toward Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.
657	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball, April 19. Low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.

No.	Document Description
658	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the NSC Standing Group, April 19. Special Report on Cuba for meeting of April 23. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
659	Annex 3 to printed Document 320, revised April 18. Current Situation: Internal Economic Situation; Internal Political Situation; Soviet Forces in Cuba. Secret. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
660	Annex 6 to printed Document 320, undated. Economic Restrictions: Shipping; Civil Aviation Trade; Strategic Commodities. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
661	Annex 7 to printed Document 320, undated. Exile Problems: The Cuban Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona; Alpha 66 and Similar Pin-Pricked Raids; The Cuban Brigade; Resettlement of Cuban Exiles. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
662	Tab 7 to printed Document 320, undated. Military Contingency Planning—CINCLANT OPLANS for Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/23/63 (Part A).
663	Research memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, April 19. Effects of loss of Cuban sugar on free world sugar market. Limited Official Use. 2 pp. DOS, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 50, Cuba—Standing Group.
664	Memorandum from FitzGerald to McCone, April 22. Effects of the curtailment of exile hit and run raids. Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 91-00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.
665	Memorandum from Kent to McCone, April 22. CIA Office of National Estimates study entitled "Cuba a Year Hence." Secret. 17 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.

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No.	Document Description
666	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Martin and Ball, April 24. President's concern about the Cuban Revolutionary Council. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
667	Memorandum from McNamara to the Chairman of the JCS, April 24, enclosing revision of DOD-State paper entitled "U-2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans." Top Secret. 11 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1903, 000.1—.
668	Paper prepared by Joseph Califano, April 25. Covert intelligence collection, hit and run raids, sabotage, and resistance activities. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Sabotage/Destruction.
669	Memorandum from McCone to the Special Group, April 25. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963.
670	Memorandum prepared by McCone, April 25. Cuban Policy: Various aspects of the Cuban problem and discussion at Standing Group. Secret. 12 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
<i>May 1963</i>	
671	Memorandum from Helms to McCone, May 1. Interview of U.S. newswoman with Castro indicating possible interest in rapprochement with the United States. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
672	Memorandum from Cottrell to Martin, May 2. Lisa Howard's interview with Castro. No classification marking. 1 p. DOS, CF, POL 15-1 CUBA.
673	Memorandum from the Deputy Director of USIA to McGeorge Bundy, May 4, advocating that a high-U.S. Government official make a statement expressing U.S. views of post-Castro Cuba and enclosing proposed statement. Confidential. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63.

No.	Document Description
674	Paper prepared by the CIA, May 6. "Cuban Supply and Demand of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products." Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.
675	Paper prepared by the CIA, undated. List of additional covert actions against Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.
676	Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara, May 10. U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Miscellaneous 63-65.
677	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Brubeck, May 15. U-2 flights, Cuba—contingency plans. Top Secret. 1 p. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights, Contingency Plans.
678	Memorandum for the record prepared by McCone, May 15. Review with Rusk about the Castro trip to Moscow. Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Memoranda for the Record.
679	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 24. Lifting of the NOTAM over Cuba and non-resumption of PanAm Flights to Havana. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Lifting of NOTAM re Cuba, 5/63-6/63.
680	Memorandum from Joseph Califano to Vance, May 27. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, which discussed U.S. policy on Cuban exiles in the United States. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files.
681	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to the NSC Standing Group, May 27. Transmits paper entitled "The World Price of Sugar." Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group, 5/28/63.

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No.	Document Description
682	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, May 27, enclosing a memorandum entitled "Possible Soviet Initiatives To End U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance Over Cuba." Top Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.
683	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, May 28. U.S. policy toward exile unity and enclosing a May 22 statement by Edwin Martin before a Senate Subcommittee on the same subject. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63-6/63.
684	Memorandum from Kent to McCone, May 29. Implications of Castro's visit to the Soviet Union. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
<i>June 1963</i>	
685	Memorandum from Helms to McCone, June 5. Reported desire of the Cuban Government for rapprochement with the United States. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V.
686	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, undated. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. Secret. 7 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, Misc. 63, 64, 65.
687	National Intelligence Estimate 85-63, June 14. "Situation and Prospects in Cuba." Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.
688	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, June 15. U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 38/1-35752/63 15 June 63.
689	Diplomatic note from the Czech Ambassador to Rusk, June 24, transmitting a note of protest from the Cuban Government to the U.S. Government. No classification marking. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63.

No.	Document Description
690	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kaysen and Ball, June 24. U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba in response to Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
691	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McNamara and Ball and U. Alexis Johnson, June 24. U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba in response to Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
692	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Kaysen and Ball, June 24. U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. No classification marking. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
693	Memorandum of telephone conversation between McCone and Ball, June 25. Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
694	Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ed Martin and Ball, June 25. Response to the Cuban note of protest. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
<i>July 1963</i>	
695	Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 2. Recent events in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.
696	Memorandum of conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Ball, July 3. Travel restrictions to Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba.
697	Memorandum from Bromley Smith to the NSC Standing Group, July 9. Transmits paper prepared by the Department of Agriculture entitled "Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar." Confidential. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.

No.	Document Description
698	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 12. Progress report on Cuba including reply to Cuban note on overflights; Cuban refugees in Miami; Kennedy doctrine. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.
699	Proposed statement, July 12. U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Confidential. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.
700	Proposed statement by President Kennedy on July 26, undated. U.S. policy toward a post-Castro Cuba. Confidential. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.
701	Memorandum prepared by McGeorge Bundy, July 16. NSC record of actions at July 16 meeting. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63.
702	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, July 22. U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive, 1963, 000.1—.
703	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, July 23, 1963. Cuban protest note; free world shipping to Cuba. Secret. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. X, 7/63.
<i>August 1963</i>	
704	Memorandum from General LeMay to McNamara, August 1, with two appendices. U.S. action in event of Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships. Top Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1963, Rules of Engagement.
705	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, August 9. Pending Cuban items: expropriation of American Embassy in Havana; reply to Cuban note on overflights; American students in Cuba; the Cuban amendment; contingency planning for further Cuban immigration. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. XI (A), 8/63.

No.	Document Description
706	Memorandum from Hurwitch to the Special Group, August 12. 3 pages of source text not declassified. Secret. WNRC, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 131, Book II—Special Group.
<i>September 1963</i>	
707	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, September 1963. Exile raids—extent of knowledge within the Executive branch. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63.
708	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to McCone, September 17. 4 pages of source text not declassified. Secret. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63.
709	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, September 19. Cuba and the IMF. Confidential. 1 p. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Vol. XI (B), 9/63.
710	Memorandum from McCone to the Chairman of COMOR, September 27. High-level photographic coverage of Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.
<i>October 1963</i>	
711	Memorandum from Colonel Haig to Vance, October 2. Meeting of the NSC Standing Group: the situation in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, Misc. 63, 64, 65.
712	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, October 4. Highlights of Chase's visit to Guantanamo Base October 1-2. Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Cuba, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/63-10/4/63.
713	Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, October 21. Reappraisal of previous proposals for support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, OSD Files: FRC 330-77-131, Misc. 63, 64, 65.
714	Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, October 21. Draft State-Defense contingency plan for a coup in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—.

No.	Document Description
715	Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, October 21. Proposal for air strikes against Cuban targets. Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0131, Sabatoge/Destruction.
716	Memorandum from General Carroll to McNamara, October 24. Transmits a DIA-CIA assessment of status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.
717	Memorandum from J. Larocque to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 25. Transmits information report on interview with Fidel Castro. Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files; FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.
<i>November 1963</i>	
718	Memorandum for the record, November 14. Minutes of the meeting to review the Cuban program. Secret. 7 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-30 November 1963.
719	Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-63, November 15. "The Effects of Hurricane Flora on Cuba." Secret. 3 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.
720	Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, November 29. Cuban contingency planning. Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba, Contingency Planning.
<i>December 1963</i>	
721	Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, December 2. Transmits talking points for Rusk's December 2 meeting with President Johnson on Cuba. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, S/S Files; Lot 66 D 501, Cuba.
722	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, December 2. Attendance at the meeting with President Johnson scheduled that day. Top Secret. 1 p. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65.
723	Memorandum, December 9. Suggestion for additional administration statements on Cuba to stimulate anti-Castro action on the part of dissident elements in the Cuban Armed Forces. Secret. 3 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Vol. 2.

No.	Document Description
724	Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, December 11. Amendment of NSAM 220 governing foreign flag shipping in the Cuba trade. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220.
725	Memorandum prepared in the CIA, December 12. Current U.S. policy with respect to Cuba. Secret. 8 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba Meetings, 12/63–3/65.
726	Memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy, December 12. Possible courses of action in controlling arms shipments between Cuba and Latin America. Secret. 2 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Vol. A (Gordon Chase File), 11/63–5/64.
727	Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, December 12. Transmits paper entitled "Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of the Use of Force)" for discussion at the NSC Standing Group meeting December 13. Top Secret. 11 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights—Contingency Plans.
728	Special report prepared by the CIA, December 13. "Fidel Castro's Growing Military Power." Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label.
729	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, December 15. Discussion of further possible measures the U.S. can take against Castro that stop short of invasion and blockade in preparation for the President's meeting with State, Defense, and CIA officials December 19. Top Secret. 23 pp. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63–3/65.
730	Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to holders of NSAM 220, December 16. Amendment to NSAM 220 relating to U.S. Government shipments by foreign-flag vessels in the Cuban trade. No classification marking. 1 p. Johnson Library, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Meetings 12/63–3/65.
731	Briefing notes prepared for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, December 18. "The Situation in Cuba." Top Secret. 2 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba Meeting—12/19/63.

No.	Document Description
732	Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 85-4-63, December 18. "Soviet Transfer of the Surface to Air Missile System to Cuba." Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry.
733	Memorandum for the record prepared by General Carter, December 19. Transmits FitzGerald's memorandum for the record of a meeting with President Johnson on Cuba on December 19. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963.
734	Memorandum from General Carroll to McNamara, December 20. Transmits a DIA/CIA assessment of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May thru Dec. 1963.

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